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You've got time
Think of all the roads
Think of all their crossings
Everything is different
The second time around
-Regina Spektor

Abstract
Willén,  R.  M. (2016).  Counting on the Details: Inquiring Into Past Events of Cooperative
Interviewees. Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 
Amount  and  quality  of  detail  in  recollections  of  past  events  are  often  studied  in  legal
psychology. What, how much, and how accurate does a witness typically recall? How can we
facilitate  witnesses'  recollections in  police  interviews? How can we detect  deception? The
overall aim of this thesis was to employ research with high ecological validity to investigate
amount and quality of detail in interviews with cooperative adults. Study I investigated details
in true and false confessions by 30 cooperative offenders in a within-subject experiment. The
confessions concerned one crime the respondent had conducted and been sentenced for (true
confession) and one crime the respondent had never conducted nor been sentenced for (false
confession).  Studies II  and III  investigated details in interviews with 95 cooperative adults
about repeated dental visits. Study II was an experiment employing a within-subject design to
investigate the effect  of  context-specific  cues on recollection of repeated events.  Study III
further  studied  the  data  by  investigating  how  five  factors  (interviewee  age,  rehearsal,
interviewer,  number  of  experienced  events,  and  unpleasantness)  affected  two  different
measures of amount and quality of detail.  Study IV made all data from Studies II and III,
supplemented with a codebook, freely available in an online repository. Surprisingly, Study I
showed very few differences in amount and quality of detail between offenders' true and false
confessions. However, three detail measures could distinguish the true and false statements,
which  is  promising  for  future  research  on  offenders'  statements.  Results  from  Study  II
suggested that context-specific cues may generate more details about repeated events than cues
commonly used in police interviews. Thus, mnemonics such as context-specific cues may, in
the future, be a positive addition to current mnemonic techniques employed in legal practice.
Study III showed that the two different detail measures were affected differently by all five
factors (e.g., who conducted the interview did have an affect on one of the two measures but
had no effect on the second measure). The results highlight the need for standardization of how
we measure amount and quality of detail in research on investigative interviewing. The data
from Studies II and III can be reused as data from an experiment (including both interviews, as
in Study II) or as single interview data (including data only from Interview I, as in Study III).
The  data  and  material  can  be  used  for  research  and  educational  purposes.  This  thesis
contributes to the ongoing methodological revolution in psychology by practicing transparent
reporting, publishing the data for Studies II and III, and by raising the problem of using non-
standardized procedures and measures in research on investigative interviewing. 
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Swedish Summary
Detaljrikedom  är  ett  begrepp  av  central  betydelse  i  många  rättsliga
utredningar.  I  polisförhör  och  domstolsutredningar  rörande  sexuella
övergrepp eller  våld i  hemmet är  detaljrikedomen i målsägarens berättelse
något man ofta bedömer och återkommer till under utredningens gång. Även
i  asylärenden  görs  en  bedömning  av  detaljrikedomen  i  den  asylsökandes
berättelse.  Det  är  därför  naturligt  att  detaljrikedom  också  har  en  central
betydelse inom rättspsykologisk forskning där man till exempel studerar hur
väl  olika  förhörstekniker  och  tillförlitlighetsbedömningar  fungerar.  Det
kanske främsta måttet på hur väl en förhörsteknik fungerar är nämligen hur
detaljrik  (och  korrekt)  utsaga  den  förhörde  ger.  Enligt  rättspsykologisk
forskning är det vanligt att falska utsagor (dvs, en lögn) kännetecknas av brist
på detaljrikedom. I linje med detta är det vanligt i domstolsutredningar att en
målsägares  utsaga  inte  godkänns  som  bevis  om  den  anses  vara  alltför
detaljfattig. 
Avhandlingens övergripande syfte
Denna doktorsavhandling består av tre empiriska arbeten och en artikel där
all  data  från  två  av  de  empiriska  studierna  gjordes  offentligt  tillgängliga.
Avhandlingens  övergripande  syfte  var  att,  med  så  realistiska
undersökningsmetoder  som  möjligt,  studera  detaljrikedomen  i
minnesrapporter från intervjupersoner som samarbetar med intervjuaren för
att ge en så detaljerad utsaga som möjligt. 
Metoder och resultat
I denna avhandling studerades detaljrikedomen i totalt 125 individers utsagor.
I Studie I intervjuades 30 personer intagna vid svenska kriminalvårdsanstalter
om  brottsliga  händelser  så  som   misshandel  eller  stöld.  Varje  deltagare
intervjuades två gånger med en kort paus mellan de två intervjuerna. I en
intervju gav deltagaren ett sant erkännande av ett brott hen hade begått och
dömts för, och i en annan intervju gav deltagaren ett falskt erkännande av ett
brott  hen  aldrig  hade  begått  eller  dömts  för.  Vi  studerade  därefter
detaljrikedomen  i  dessa  erkännanden  genom  att  tillämpa  två  olika
kriteriebaserade  verktyg:  Criteria-Based  Content  Analysis  (CBCA)  och
Reality  Monitoring  (RM).  I  linje  med  tidigare  rättspsykologisk  forskning
predicerades det att de sanna erkännandena skulle vara mer detaljerade än de
falska erkännandena. 
Resultaten  från  studien  visade  dock  på  mycket  få  skillnader  i
detaljrikedom mellan de sanna och falska erkännandena. Det gick helt enkelt
inte att  använda CBCA eller RM för att  skilja de sanna utsagorna från de
påhittade. CBCA och RM består av sammanlagt 31 kriterier som på mer eller
mindre olika sätt kan sägas mäta detaljrikedom. Endast 3 av dessa kriterier
var användbara för att skilja de sanna utsagorna från de påhittade. De sanna
utsagorna innehöll  oftare  beskrivningar  av oväntade komplikationer  (t.ex.,
”när jag körde ut från gården hoppade en höna plötsligt ut framför bilen, så
jag var tvungen att gå ut och lyfta undan den innan jag kunde fortsätta”). De
påhittade utsagorna däremot innehöll (oftare än de sanna) tvivel rörande den
egna utsagan (t.ex., ”nu när jag hör mig själv berätta det här för dig så låter
det helt otroligt att det verkligen skulle ha gått till på det här viset...”), och
nedvärderande eller ogillande uttalanden rörande den egna personen kopplat
till  händelsen (t.ex.,  ”det  var så hemskt  av mig att  göra så mot henne”).
Resultaten från Studie I visar att sanna och falska erkännanden från personer
med kriminell erfarenhet kan vara mycket svåra – men inte omöjliga – att
särskilja.  
I Studierna II och III intervjuades 95 personer om de tandvårdsbesök de
hade  gjort  under  den  senaste  10-årsperioden.  I  Studie  II  intervjuades
deltagarna  vid  två  tillfällen  med  en  kort  paus  emellan.  I  första  intervjun
ombads de försöka minnas så mycket som möjligt och berätta om detta.  I
andra intervjun ombads deltagarna berätta om den ytterligare information de
eventuellt  kommit  ihåg  under  pausen.  I  pausen  fick  deltagarna  ta  del  av
sådant som eventuellt kan vara till hjälp för att minnas tandvårdsbesöken. Det
fanns tre olika typer av sådant potentiellt minnesunderlättande material och
varje deltagare fick ta del av en av dem: (1) Sådant som andra personer i
samma situation sagt sig ha haft hjälp av för att minnas sina tandvårdsbesök.
Ca  30  deltagare  fick  ta  del  av  detta  som  enbart  kategorier,  t.ex.  ”Tänk
tillbaka på sådant  du pratat  om med personalen” och  ”Tänk tillbaka på
orsaken till besöket”. (2) En annan grupp av lika många deltagare fick ta del
av  kategorierna  tillsammans  med  citat  från  personer  som  varit  i  samma
situation (t.ex.  ”Tänk tillbaka på sådant du pratat om med personalen” och
fem  tillhörande  citat,  t.ex.  ”Jag  fick  instruktioner  om  hur  jag  skulle
förebygga hål” och ”Jag lovade tandläkaren att sluta snusa”). (3) En tredje
grupp fick ta del av sådant som ofta används i polisintervjuer idag i syftet att
underlätta för målsägaren att minnas mer. T.ex. ”Tänk tillbaka på om något
tillfälle skiljer sig från de övriga”, och ”Tänk tillbaka på senaste gången det
hände”. Denna  typ  av  instruktioner  gavs  till  en  tredje  grupp  om  ca  30
deltagare. I linje med tidigare forskning på området förväntade vi oss att de
två  förstnämnda  materialen  skulle  generera  mer  detaljrikedom  än  sådant
material som idag används i polisförhör. 
I Studierna II och III mättes detaljrikedom på två sätt. Vi räknade antalet
enskilda tandvårdsbesök som deltagaren lyckades nämna minst någon slags
detalj  om,  och  med  vilken  specificitet  deltagaren  beskrev  sina
tandvårdsbesök. Specificiteten mätte vi genom att kategorisera allt deltagaren
sa  som  antingen  specifikt,  specifikt-förlängt,  eller  generellt.  Denna
kategorisering  är  vanlig  inom  klinisk  psykologisk  forskning  om
autobiografiskt minne och mäter hur detaljrikt personen beskriver ett  visst
minne. 
Resultaten från Studie II visade små statistiska skillnader i detaljrikedom
mellan de tre grupperna, men i linje med prediktionen generade materialet
baserat på andra tandvårdspatienters erfarenheter något högre detaljrikedom
än  materialet  som idag  ofta  används  i  polisförhör.  Resultaten  innebär  att
förhörstekniker möjligen på sikt kunde vinna på att integrera någon typ av
frågor som baseras på andra individers erfarenheter av liknande situationer.
I Studie III undersökte vi på ett explorativt sätt vad deltagarna berättade i
sin första intervju (andra intervjun ingick således enbart  i  Studie II,  inte i
Studie III). Mer specifikt studerade vi hur fem olika faktorer påverkade de två
måtten på detaljrikedom (dvs, antalet enskilda besök deltagaren nämnde och
mängden  specificitet  i  berättelsen).  De  fem  faktorer  vi  undersökte  var
deltagarens ålder, hur många tandvårdsbesök personen hade gjort under de
senaste  10  åren,  hur  mycket  deltagaren  hade  tänkt  på  eller  pratat  om
tandvårdsbesöken efter det att de ägde rum, hur obehagligt deltagaren fann
tandvårdsbesök vara, och vem som genomförde intervjun. Resultaten visade
att de två olika måtten på detaljrikedom aldrig påverkades på samma sätt av
de fem faktorer vi testade. Till exempel ökade mängden specificitet om en
viss  intervjuare  skötte  intervjun,  men  antalet  enskilda  besök  deltagaren
nämnde  påverkades  inte  av  vem  som  genomförde  intervjun.  Ett  annat
exempel  är  att  det  inte  spelade  någon  roll  för  mängden  specificitet  hur
obehagligt  deltagaren  fann  tandvårdsbesök  vara,  men  däremot  kom
deltagarna  ofta  ihåg  fler  enskilda  besök  om  de  överlag  tyckte  att
tandvårdsbesök  är  mycket  obehagliga.  Resultaten  från  Studie  III  visar  på
problemen  med  att  det  ännu  saknas  ett  standardiserat  sätt  att  mäta
detaljrikedom på. Detta gör resultat från olika studier svåra att jämföra med
varandra och försvagar forskningsfältets vetenskaplighet. 
Datan från Studierna II och III publicerades i ett offentligt digitalt arkiv
och  beskrevs  i  Studie  IV.  Således  är  all  data  från  dessa  två  studier  fritt
tillgängligt för vem som helst att återanvända. Även allt forskningsmaterial
som utgjorde grund för Studierna II och III finns offentligt tillgängligt online.
Datan kan återanvändas som data från ett experiment (vilket skulle inkludera
datan från båda intervjuerna, som i Studie II) eller som vanlig intervjudata
(vilket skulle inkludera data enbart från den första intervjun, som i Studie
III). Både data och material kan återanvändas och modifieras för att användas
i forskning eller utbildning. 
Slutsatser
Denna doktorsavhandling bidrar till  tidigare rättspsykologisk forskning om
utredande  förhör  på  minst  tre  sätt.  Först  och  främst  har  avhandlingens
empiriska studier alla en hög nivå av realism (s.k., ekologisk validitet) i sin
utformning.  Detta  är  relativt  ovanligt  i  rättspsykologisk  forskning  om
utredande förhör där detaljrikedom studeras. För det andra har såväl data som
forskningsmaterial  publicerats  offentligt  vilket  gör  det  möjligt  för  andra
forskare  att  bygga  vidare  på  arbetet  men  också  möjliggör  kontroller  av
arbetets kvalitet. För det tredje lyfter denna avhandling upp problemet med
bristen  på  standardisering  av  detaljrikedom  inom  rättspsykologin.  Utan
standardisering  av  ett  såpass  centralt  begrepp som detaljrikedom hämmas
fältet i  sin kunskapsutveckling och vi  rättspsykologer riskerar ge felaktiga
rekommendationer  till  rättspraktiker,  vilket  i  sin  tur  kan  öka  risken  för
(objektivt sett) felaktiga beslut i rättsliga utredningar.  
Sedan  2011  pågår  en  omfattande  metodologisk  revolution  inom
psykologin och andra empiriska vetenskaper. Psykologin går med hastiga och
beslutsamma  steg  mot  ökad  vetenskaplig  transparens.  Allt  fler  tidskrifter,
finansiärer och enskilda forskare kräver mer transparent (i det här fallet mer
ärlig och fullständig) rapportering av metod och resultat, preregistrering av
studierna  innan  dess  att  datainsamlingen  påbörjats,  och  öppen  och  fri
publicering  av  såväl  forskningsartiklar  som  av  data  och  material.  Denna
avhandling  bidrar  till  den  pågående  revolutionen  genom  att  praktisera
transparent och ärlig rapportering och genom att data och material gjorts fritt
tillgängligt i öppna digitala arkiv. 
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Introduction
Think back to yesterday and try to recall the day. How and when did it begin?
How did it proceed? What happened at which time? How and when did it
end?
Calling particular events into mind, such as recalling the yesterday, may
bear some resemblance to projecting a video or a series of still photographs to
the inner mind (although our memory is far from a recording of the events).
However,  while  some parts  may  come to  mind easily  and  without  much
deliberate effort, other parts will remain blank regardless of how much we
try. Yet other parts of the events may be recollected only during the right
circumstances, such as the right questions being asked in the right way.
Telling  in  words  to  someone  about  a  memory  of  events  would  mean
putting  into  words  a  complex  collection  of  stimuli.  The  words  may  be
descriptions  of  something  seen,  heard,  tasted,  smelled,  sensed,  felt,  or
thought.  The descriptions can be more or less detailed because of factors
such  as  personality,  cognition,  motivation,  social  and  communicative
dynamics, or environmental and physical conditions. Some people really like
to talk, others prefer not to. Some people really like listening to what others
have to say, others do not. Sometimes you are just too tired to concentrate or
not really motivated to tell the story once again. Other times you might find it
difficult describing events in detail simply because you misremember or, for
any (good or bad) reason, are making things up.
Variations in amount and quality of detail provided when recollecting past
events  are  studied  by  psychological  researchers  for  different  reasons.  For
instance, in clinical settings, individuals suffering from depression or post-
traumatic  stress  may  need  memory  training  to  increase  the  chances  of
rehabilitation;  increased recollection of  details  can moderate  symptoms of
depression. It can also be important in health settings to know in what detail –
and how accurately – people usually recall  past events,  for instance when
inquiring about medical history.
Variations  in  amount  and  quality  of  detail  have  also  been  frequently
investigated within legal and forensic psychology. Several research questions
within  this  area  have  often  been  studied  by  measuring  variations  in  the
details.  What,  how  much,  and  how  accurate  does  a  witness  typically
remember and report? How can we facilitate witnesses' recollection during
police interviews? How can we detect deception? The scope of the current
thesis covers all three questions with an overall focus on amount and quality
of detail reported by cooperative interviewees. It consists of three empirical
1
studies and one data article (hereafter, all four papers will be referred to as
“studies”).  Study  I  investigated  details  in  true  and  false  confessions  by
cooperative offenders. Studies II, III, and IV regarded details in interviews
with cooperative individuals about repeated events. 
The initial aim of this thesis was to conduct a series of studies on memory
for repeated events and how recollection of such memories can be facilitated
in police interviews. However, the data collection for Studies II, III, and IV
turned out to be more time consuming than expected. The scope of the thesis
was therefore adjusted to include Study I. 
The  main  post  hoc  aim  of  the  present  thesis  was  to  employ  research
designs with high ecological validity to investigate the amount and quality of
detail  in interviews with cooperative interviewees. Thus, the four included
studies  share  the  following  three  features:  (1)  variations  in  amount  and
quality of detail were the primary outcome measures; (2) the interviews were
made with cooperative individuals (i.e. interviewees willing to tell about the
events);  (3) the experienced events took place under natural circumstances
and thus were not planned, induced, or controlled by any researcher. 
In light of the current methodological revolution in psychological science
(De Groot, 1956/2014), the shift in focus from memory for repeated events to
the amount and quality of detail in interviews with cooperative interviewees
generated new and interesting perspectives. Perspectives interesting not only
for this thesis but also for future research on investigative interviewing. 
How do researchers measure the amount and quality of detail? What does
it mean for overall conclusions that amount and quality are operationalized
differently in different studies? Do the many alternative measures (of details)
available  to  researchers  inflate  the  risk  of  questionable  research  practices
being employed? One example is primary outcome measures being swifted,
e.g.,  new  codings  being  made  if  the  first  did  not  result  in  statistically
detectable  results  (Simmons,  Nelson,  &  Simonsohn,  2011).  And
consequently, how can we improve our measures of amount and quality of
detail? Issues like these are in the core of science because wonky measures
will generate wonky research findings. In turn, in the field of investigative
interviewing,  wonky  research  findings  could  inspire  ineffective  or  even
harmful  legal  practices.  The importance of  dealing with how we measure
details  can thus not be underestimated.  Therefore,  a secondary aim of the
thesis was to briefly introduce and discuss issues related to counting details in
the research of investigative interviewing.   
The present  thesis  begins  with a short  introduction to  human memory,
giving  special  attention  to  three  themes  of  core  relevance  to  the  present
thesis:  memory  for  traumatic  events,  memory  for  repeated  events,  and
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memory for  events questionable  in veracity  (specifically  deceptive reports
and false  confessions).  The literature  on how to successfully elicit  details
from cooperative individuals  will  be  summarized,  including an outline  of
how the details are typically measured and analyzed. These introductions will
be followed by summaries of the four studies. Finally, the observed results
and issues are discussed and suggestions are made for future research.   
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An Introduction to Human Memory
There is a large body of knowledge concerning the human memory function,
although there is still a lot we cannot yet explain. One thing we know little
about is the actual basics of memory: exactly where it is and how we can
model it. The two most frequently employed psychological perspectives of
memory are the multiple systems view (e.g. Tulving, 1983) and the process
view (e.g. Kolers & Roediger, 1984). While the first view models memory as
consisting  of  several  different  systems,  for  example  procedural,  semantic,
working, and episodic memories of which each has its own unique capacities,
qualities and prerequisites, the processing view argues that memory capacity
and quality is rather a result  of  encoding and retrieval processes – not  of
different structures. Both views have strengths and weaknesses. Surprenant
and Neath (2009) summarize the current knowledge gaps as follows (p. 25):
“We do not know how many memory systems there are or how to define
what a memory system is.  We do not  know how many processes  (or
components  of  processing)  there  are  or  how  to  distinguish  them.
[S]hort-term memory  and long-term memory  seem to  differ  in  some
ways, as do episodic memory and semantic memory, but are they really
fundamentally different?”
Although consensus is  lacking on the number  of  memory systems and
how to define them, there seems to be some consensus on what we generally
mean when we talk about the major systems. Major memory systems central
to the present thesis are briefly described below.
Autobiographical  memory. Baddeley,  Eysenck,  and  Anderson  (2009)
described this as a system for information regarding ourselves and relations
and events that we experience during our lifetime. It can be episodic as well
as semantic (see below; Baddeley et  al.,  2009),  although some view it  as
mainly episodic (Fivush, 2011).  
Episodic  and semantic  memory. According to  Tulving (2002),  episodic
memory enables us to relive our past and make plans for the future, and it
makes it possible for us to have concepts about time (e.g. how long it will
take until we meet our friend again). Episodic memory is believed to have
developed  out  of  semantic  memory.  Semantic  memory  refers  to  general
knowledge of the world in absence of time. For example, we know that the
capital of Germany is Berlin, that there once was a group of animals called
dinosaurs, and that fire can be dangerous. It is, however, unlikely that we will
recall how or when we learned this. In contrast, episodic memory refers to
events that we have experienced, such as a holiday spent in Berlin, a visit to a
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museum where  we  saw models  of  dinosaurs,  or  a  time  when we burned
ourselves on a match. Episodic and semantic information is processed in both
short-term and long-term memory.  
Short- and long-term memory. Long-term memory is an uncontroversial
system which researchers agree exist; individuals would otherwise be unable
to hold memories and knowledge derived from the past (Cowan, 2008). In
contrast, short-term memory and working memory are disputed and there is
little agreement on how to define them, their functions, or whether or not they
exist (Cowan, 2008; Neath & Surprenant, 2008). In spite of this, short-term
memory and working memory are frequently referred to as established terms
whenever cognitive performance is an issue.     
The main scope of the present thesis is verbal reports of past events. More
specifically, recollections of autobiographical episodic memories from long-
term  memory.  It  should  however  be  noted  that  retrieval  from  long-term
memory  prerequisites  activation  of  short-term  memory.  The  short-term
memory  is  continuously  refilled  with  information  stored  in  long-term
memory (Cowan, 2000). Furthermore, short-term memory is needed for tasks
such as planning, thinking, controlling the language and choosing retrieval
cues (Shiffrin, 1993). Disruptions in short-term memory can therefore have a
negative impact on our recollection and reporting of experienced – and non-
experienced  –  events.  Thus,  capacity  and  functions  of  short-term  (and
working) memory may also be relevant for retrieval of autobiographical and
episodic memories from long-term memory.
Established Principles of Memory
A different way to introduce human memory is to focus on what we do know
about its function. Surprenant and Neath (2009) presented seven principles
(see Table 1) that describe  “fundamental empirical regularities” (p.  25) in
memory  that  today  are  supported  by  extensive  evidence  and  are  valid
regardless of how we choose to model or explain memory. The purpose of
listing established principles was to spur theory development concerning the
basics of memory, and the authors emphasize that the list is not exclusive and
may not include the most important principles. However, each of their seven
principles  is  fundamental  to  the  present  thesis  and  thereby  constitutes  a
meaningful introduction to human memory function.
First, whenever we remember something it will always start with a cue
(Tulving, 1974). The cue can, for example, be a question, a thought, a visual
stimulus,  an emotion,  a  smell,  or  a taste.  There  is  always something that
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triggers  remembering  and  that  something  is  called  a  cue  (Surprenant  &
Neath, 2009).
Second, the encoding-retrieval principle (e.g., Tulving & Thomson, 1973)
states that whether or not you will recall something depends on the match
between  conditions  during  encoding  (i.e.,  the  point  in  time  where  you
experience the to-be-remembered stimuli) and retrieval (i.e., the point in time
where you try to  recall  the  experienced stimuli).  No or  weak association
between the two conditions will have little potential to trigger remembering.
For example, it  is unlikely that pictures of vegetables will  help you recall
cities in Asia. According to Surprenant and Neath (2009), a consequence of
this  principle  is  that  items,  processes,  and  cues  do  not  have  an  intrinsic,
mnemonic  value.  That  is,  whether  or  not  a  retrieval  strategy  actually
facilitates  recollection  depends  on the encoding conditions  and the match
between retrieval strategy and encoding conditions.
Third,  cues  will  be  more  effective  if  they  do  not  have  too  many
associations  (Watkins  &  Watkins,  1975).  The  word  “Swede”  may  be  an
effective cue for someone outside of Sweden to recall a certain person, but it
will likely be rather ineffective for most people living in Sweden.
Fourth,  memory  is  reconstructive  (e.g.,  Bartlett,  1932).  It  is  created
through  a  dynamic  process  that  does  not  end  with  the  to-be-remembered
stimuli.  We reshape our memory to better fit  our expectations, beliefs and
understandings of the world around us. This is central whenever discussing
memory and recollection. Every time we call a particular event into mind, the
memory  for  this  particular  event  is  at  risk  of  being  somewhat  altered
(reconstructed). The next time we recall it, it is the altered version we recall
which again is at risk of being somewhat altered. Thus, as the next principle
states, memory is impure and far  from a recording of the objectively true
events.    
Fifth, the impurity principle (Surprenant & Neath, 2009) is a consequence
of the reconstruction principle (i.e., the fourth principle) and states that it is
not  possible  for  researchers  to  measure  a  particular  memory  system  or
process. Memory is not pure, and it is therefore impossible for outcomes to
be pure whatever measure the researcher uses.
Sixth, we will  better recollect items that,  for any reason at the time of
retrieval, stand out from the others (e.g., Fisher, 1981; Surprenant & Neath,
2009). An emergent and painful dental visit will likely stand out and therefore
be recollected (as long as there were no additional  such visits).  However,
even if  the item did not  stand out  during encoding it  might  do so during
certain retrieval conditions. A bundle of keys on the kitchen table may be
encoded without having any particular meaning to you until you reach the
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office and realize that you cannot get in. The locked door becomes the cue
that makes the memory stand out – the keys are on the kitchen table.
Seventh, the specificity principle states that specific information is more
vulnerable to memory errors than general information (Surprenant & Neath,
2009). The specific information may involve details about events or items,
such as colors, forms, names, dates, or single episodes in a series of events. In
contrast, general information regards the overall picture or typical features,
for example how something usually looks or how a certain type of event
usually occurs.
From the seven principles of memory (Surprenant & Neath, 2009) we can
draw  at  least  three  important  conclusions.  One,  cues  are  needed  for
recollection – but not any cue will do (Principles 1–3). Two, the recollections
will be more or less distorted and it is therefore not possible for a researcher
to measure memory in exact ways (Principles 4–5). Three, some details are
easier to remember than others, but overall, details are vulnerable to memory
errors (Principles 6–7).
Table 1. Seven principles of memory.
1 The cue-driven principle Recollection will always begin with a cue.
2 The encoding-retrieval principle Memory depends on the match between conditions 
at encoding and retrieval.
3 The cue-overload principle Cues are less effective when they have too many 
associations.
4 The reconstruction principle Memory is the result of many things – not only by 
information present at the time of encoding.
5 The impurity principle It is impossible to measure a particular system or 
process – memory is always impure.
6 The relative distinctiveness principle Items that stand out from the others will be well 
recalled.
7 The specificity principle Specific information is more vulnerable than 
general information.
Notes. Table adapted from Surprenant and Neath (2009; p. 7–8).
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Memory for Traumatic Events
Memory for traumatic events has been a disputed topic ever since the 1980s
when repressed memories of sexual abuse were suggested to be the cause of
diverse symptoms of psychological  distress such as  insomnia,  nightmares,
and anxiety. While some claim that memories for traumatic events are often
less detailed than emotionally neutral events – sometimes even repressed or
forgotten  (see  e.g.,  Alpert,  Brown,  &  Courtois,  1998a)  –  others  claim
memories of traumatic events to be even more detailed than memories of
emotionally neutral events (e.g., Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998). In general,
the  first  standpoint  has  been  represented  by  clinical  psychologists  and
psychotherapists  while  the  latter  standpoint  has  been  represented  by
experimental psychologists (McNally, 2005). 
Experimental psychologists prefer to give more weight to evidence from
empirical  research  (Ornstein,  Ceci,  &  Loftus,  1998)  while  clinical
psychologists tend to give more weight to case studies and experiences from
clinical practice (Alpert,  Brown, & Courtois,  1998b). Relying on evidence
from empirical research, the general conclusions are usually that experienced
events  that  were  strongly,  emotionally  charged  are  remembered  well  (for
exceptions  and  a  different  perspective,  see  e.g.,  Deffenbacher,  Bornstein,
Penrod,  &  McGorty,  2004),  although  details  that  were  peripheral  to  the
rememberer  during  encoding  might  not  be  recalled  (Christiansson,  1992;
McNally, 2005; Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998).
Traumatic events evoke post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in only a
minority  of  individuals  exposed  to  trauma  (McNally,  2005).  PTSD  is  a
psychiatric  diagnosis  characterized  by,  for  example,  re-experiences  of  the
traumatic event, avoidance of stimuli that somehow reminds of the trauma,
and emotional arousal (e.g., sleep disturbances or self-destructive behavior;
American  Psychiatric  Association,  2013).  Neuro-imaging  studies  typically
show differences  between  individuals  diagnosed  with  PTSD  and  trauma-
exposed individuals without PTSD in brain activation when presented with
trauma-related stimuli (Sartory et al., 2013). It is thus important to distinguish
between  individuals  exposed  to  trauma  and  individuals  diagnosed  with
PTSD.  Exposure  to  trauma  is  a  prerequisite  for  the  PTSD-diagnosis
according  to  the  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), but having experienced traumatic
events is not the same as showing signs of PTSD.        
Individuals who have been exposed to trauma (Ono, Devilly,  & Shum,
2016), especially if they have developed PTSD (Moore & Zoellner,  2007;
Ono,  Devilly,  &  Shum,  2016),  tend  to  report  generic,  autobiographical
memories  (e.g.,  “I  feel  happy  when I  read  books”),  even  when they  are
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explicitly  asked to  recall  specific memories (e.g.,  “I felt  happy the day I
could  not  stop  reading  a  book  by  Isabel  Allende”).  This  phenomenon  is
commonly referred to as overgeneral memory (OGM; Williams & Broadbent,
1986). Aside from trauma exposure with or without PTSD, depression (van
Vreeswijk & de Wilde,  2004) and other emotional  and affective disorders
(Williams et al., 2007) are commonly associated with OGM.  
Individuals with an overgeneral memory tend to face slow recovery from
depression, and OGM tends to linger even after recovery (Raes, Williams, &
Hermans, 2009). It has therefore been suggested that psychological treatment
for  OGM itself  could  reduce  vulnerability  to  depression  and increase  the
chances  of  successful  recovery  (Raes  et  al.,  2009).  For  this  purpose,  a
training  program  has  been  developed  to  enhance  memory  specificity  in
clinical populations (this training program is further discussed in a section
below). It has been suggested that overgeneral responses may be a result of
an inability to remain focused during retrieval (Williams et al., 2007). 
OGM tends to  be stable over  time (Sumner,  Mineka,  Zinbarg,  Craske,
Vrshek-Schallhorn,  &  Epstein,  2014);  however,  individuals  can  be
conditioned  to  provide  more  specific  answers  (Debeer,  Raes,  Williams,
Craeynest,  &  Hermans,  2014).  In  contrast,  it  seems  more  difficult  to
condition  generic  responding.  This  finding  may  indicate  that  overgeneral
responding is not learned but rather a dysfunction during retrieval that can be
at least temporarily reversed. This can have important implications for legal
investigations because it shows that recollection of specific memories really
can be enhanced – even for individuals prone to overgeneral responding –
through adequate support before or during retrieval.
Memory for Repeated Events
The  term “repisodic  memory”  was  coined  by  Neisser  (1981)  to  describe
episodic  recollection  of  repeated  events  that  has  an  overall  correctness
although the specific details may be ascribed to the wrong event. The concept
is closely related to – albeit different from – the terms “schemata” (Bartlett,
1932) and “script” (Schank & Abelson, 1977). The meaning of schemata is
any general  knowledge  about  the  world  around  us:  about  events,  people,
things,  places,  and actions.  We may have schematic knowledge about  our
own close relatives or family members in general (e.g., the role of mothers,
fathers, siblings), and about places we may have visited or not (e.g., that in
France you can visit the Eiffel tower, smoke Gauloise, and taste nice wines).
In  contrast,  script  refers  only  to  schematic  knowledge  about  events
(Baddeley et al., 2009), for example, how a restaurant visit, pocket theft, or
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dental visit usually occurs. Script is thereby a key concept when discussing
memory  for  events,  although  other  types  of  schematic  knowledge  may
influence our memory of particular details related to an event (e.g., script is
relevant  to our memory of a restaurant  visit,  although our memory of the
waiter may be more shaped by other general knowledge we have). Hence,
repisodic memories (Neisser, 1981) can be influenced by the scripts we have
for  different  types  of  events  (Schank & Abelson,  1977)  as  well  as  other
schematic knowledge (Bartlett, 1932).
Repeated events tend to be recalled in a general manner (e.g., Roberts &
Powell,  2001).  We  recall  how  it  usually  happened  (the  gist)  but  face
difficulties  when  trying  to  specify  details  or  describe  individual  episodes
(verbatim memory). Gist-based information takes less effort to process and it
may be stored independently of the  details  (Reyna & Brainerd,  1995).  In
addition, it  is retrieved differently in the sense that different retrieval cues
seem to evoke mainly gist or details (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004). For example,
thematic cues as “food” tend to evoke gist memories, while specific cues as
“potato” tend  to  generate  detailed  memories.  The  gist  of  encoded
information is usually remembered well while the specific details are more
vulnerable to errors (Surprenant & Neath, 2009). 
According to an overview by Reyna and Brainerd (1995), specific details
fade more rapidly than gist memory, and there is a higher risk that details will
be  inaccurately  recalled.  For  instance,  gist  information  can  be  highly
influenced  by  schematic  knowledge  (e.g.,  Koriat,  Goldsmith,  &  Pansky,
2000) which in turn may lead to the inaccurate remembrance of details. A
frequently cited example of this is that when people are presented with a list
of related words (e.g., table, sit, legs, sofa, rest, desk), they tend to falsely
recognize  another  related  word  (e.g.,  chair)  as  present  (Roediger  &
McDermott,  1995).  In  addition,  it  can  be  difficult  to  trace  the  origin  of
details, for instance, pinpointing when a particular topic was discussed during
a  holiday  with  the  family  (a  source  monitoring  problem;  Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Hence, people can often remain accurate by
reporting  gist-based  information  instead  of  specific  details  (Reyna  &
Brainerd,  1995).  This  implies  that  it  should  not  always  be  preferable  to
extract specific information since sooner or later it will most likely be on the
cost  of  accuracy.  If  one  does  however  want  to  enhance  recollection  of
specific details one should employ cues that are specific (Brainerd & Reyna,
2004).
Specificity in recollections of a unique and single event refers to a detailed
account about the event, for example, what happened, when it happened, and
who was involved. However, when discussing repeated events, the reported
memories can be specific in at least two different ways. One can be specific
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by providing details in general about the episodes (e.g.,  “I’ve had the same
dentist since I moved to town 10 years ago. Her name is Paula. She is very
gentle and I like her a lot, but sometimes she’s a bit confused and forgets
things”),  and  one  can  be  specific  by  providing  details  about  a  particular
episode (e.g., “On one occasion my dentist misplaced her glasses and I had
to wait while she looked for them, and on a different occasion we had to
cancel the appointment because she had scheduled me on the wrong day”).
Although there are many details in the former example, there is no specificity
of individual events as there is in the latter example. Both types of specificity
are relevant when discussing recollections of repeated events.
Although also relevant to other areas (e.g., survey methodology, Means &
Loftus, 1991), most research on repeated events has been conducted within
the area of legal and forensic psychology. The largest body of literature so far
has  concerned  repeated  abuse  of  children,  more  specifically  child  sexual
abuse (e.g., Connolly & Gordon, 2014; Connolly, Price, Lavoie, & Gordon,
2008; Powell, Roberts, & Guadagno, 2007; Roberts & Powell, 2001). Reports
of repeated events and abuse may, to some extent, face the same or similar
difficulties  regardless  of  age.  However,  research  on  adults’ memories  for
repeated events has, so far (and to the best of my knowledge), not concerned
abuse.  When  adult  asylum  seekers’ statements  about  repeated  events  are
discussed (e.g., UNHCR, 2013) it is instead literature on survey methodology
(e.g., Cohen & Java, 1995) that is cited. In addition, Neisser (1981) presented
a case study on John Dean’s written and verbal testimonies of the Watergate
events. John Dean was a key witness in the case against President Nixon in
the  1970s,  and  the  testimonies  regarded  repeated  and  similar  meetings
between Dean and Nixon. 
Adults’ memories for repeated events have also been investigated within a
new line  of  research  that  aims  at  developing  techniques  for  interviewing
detainees (i.e., individuals who are held at military bases and suspected of
terrorism  or  suspected  to  hold  information  about  such  activities).  For
instance,  Leins,  Fisher,  Pludwinski,  Rivard,  and Robertson (2014)  studied
how to enhance recollection of individual episodes from a series of repeated
and  similar  meetings  that  detainees  might  have  attended,  for  example
political  or  religious  meetings  during  which  activists  and  combatants  are
sometimes recruited for guerrilla warfare.       
Thus, the study of memory for repeated events has great implications for
legal matters (repeated abuse against children and adults, and repeated events
of  various  kinds experienced by  asylum seekers,  detainees,  or  witnesses).
Except  from the research  on  survey methodology (e.g.,  Means  & Loftus,
1991) and Neisser’s  (1981) case study,  a common feature of the previous
research is that the respondents/participants do not belong to the population
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for  which  the  research  is  generalized.  This  means  that  conclusions  about
memories  of  abuse  or  detainees’  recollections  are  uncertain.  We  may
conclude that memories of repeated events in other populations suggest that it
is in a certain way, but we should be careful when discussing implications for
other populations or types of events. 
Although it is reasonable to believe that our memory for repeated events
has  some basic  features  that  are  common across  event  types,  research on
related topics needs to be taken into account as well (e.g., how our memory is
affected  by  trauma and  psychopathology,  interrogation/interview methods,
effects of long periods of isolation, and humiliating treatment in custody).
Memory for Events Questionable in Veracity
Accounts  may  be  inaccurate  in  different  ways  and  for  different  reasons.
Sometimes  they  are  inaccurate  because  of  honest  mistakes,  for  example,
because of the reconstructive nature of memory (Bartlett,  1932) or due to
external factors such as social influence (e.g., implicit or explicit suggestive
questions  and misinformation;  e.g.,  Loftus,  2005;  Loftus & Palmer,  1974;
Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986). Sometimes we form memories, so-called
false  memories,  for  events  that  we  in  fact  never  experienced  (e.g.,  Ost,
Granhag, Udell, & Roos af Hjelmsäter, 2008; Sjödén, Granhag, Ost, & Roos
af Hjelmsäter, 2009). Sometimes, such a memory can persist in an individual
even after s/he learned that the memory was false (for a recent review on
non-believed memories, see Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014). 
Other times, an account is inaccurate because of deliberate deceit. Such
deceit may in turn occur because of different reasons. Among the obvious and
possible  reasons  is  that  the  person  wants  to  conceal  a  wrongdoing.  Less
obvious reasons may be that the truth is shameful or could harm someone.
Occasionally,  in  legal  settings,  a  witness  or  suspect  provides  a  deceitful
confession,  a so-called false confession,  of  a  crime to cover for someone
else's wrongdoing. 
Empirical  population-based  survey  research  from  Iceland  showed  that
about 12% of the participating prisoners had confessed falsely during a police
interview at least once in their lifetime (Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 1994).
Most commonly, the false confessions had been provided to protect someone
else, but another common reason was to escape a very uncomfortable and
pressing police  interview.  Similarly,  about  30% of exonerated,  wrongfully
convicted prisoners had falsely confessed to the crime (or made incriminating
statements  against  themselves),  usually  because  of  coercion  and  harsh
interview methods (Innocence Project,  2016;  Kassin,  2015).  Today,  it  is  a
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well-established  fact  that  there  is  an  increased  risk  of  eliciting  false
confessions if coercive interview techniques are employed (Kassin, Drizin,
Grisso, Gudjonsson, Leo, & Redlich, 2010). However, false confessions also
do occur in the absence of harsh techniques. For instance, an individual might
be  motivated  to  falsely  confess  to  protect  someone  else  (Gudjonsson  &
Sigurdsson, 1994), maybe even having  been paid to do so. 
Arguably,  uncoerced,  false  confessions  are  typically  provided  by
individuals  willing  to  give  a  (more  or  less)  complete  narrative  about  the
supposedly  experienced  events.  In  that  sense,  such  confessions  could  be
viewed as deceitful accounts made by cooperative suspects. This is the main
perspective we employed in Study I in which uncoerced, false confessions
were analyzed and compared to (uncoerced) true confessions. Therefore, in
this thesis as well  as in the published article for Study I,  the terms 'false
confessions'  and  'deceptive  accounts'  (or  simply  'lies')  are  used
interchangeably.    
It  happens  that  we  ourselves  are  unsure  of  whether,  for  example,  a
memory  from  childhood  is  based  on  real  experience  or  perhaps  only
imaginations  based on photographs or  stories  told by our  parents or  even
other  people  who  were  present  at  the  time.  For  this  specific  purpose  of
making it possible for people to distinguish their own memories of imagined
events from memories of events that truly were experienced, Johnson and
Raye (1981) developed the Reality Monitoring Framework. During a period
of  several  years,  which  resulted  in  a  number  of  papers,  they  developed,
refined and tested this framework. One of the findings during this period was
that there are qualitative differences between memories for imagined events
and memories  for  truly experienced events.  Some factors  can make them
more difficult  to  distinguish,  for  example,  the  extent  to  which  the  events
(imagined or not) have been rehearsed in memory. Talking or thinking much
about  the  events  have  the  tendency  to  make  memories  for  imagined  and
experienced  events  more  alike  (Suengas  &  Johnson,  1988).  In  general,
though, memories of truly experienced events tend to include more details of
various kinds, for instance more visual, auditory, perceptual, temporal, and
spatial  details  (Johnson,  Foley,  Suengas,  &  Raye,  1988).  The  Reality
Monitoring Framework would later be further developed into a criteria-based
technique (simply referred to as Reality Monitoring; Alonso-Quecuty, 1992)
for distinguishing truthful statements from deceptive statements. There are
additional criteria-based techniques with the same purpose and fundamental
starting  point.  There  are  differences  in  the  amount  and  quality  of  detail
described when reporting about events that were only imagined (or made up)
and events that were truly experienced. We will return to this subject in a later
section (see the section Statement Analysis).  
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Eliciting Details
Investigative Interviewing
Verbal accounts from interviewees are the most common evidence in criminal
investigations.  However,  according  to  surveyed  police  investigators,  the
amount of detail provided by the interviewees is often insufficient (Kebbell &
Milne, 1998). Since the 1980s, experimental psychologists have therefore set
out  to  develop  interview  techniques  that  are  based  upon  scientifically
generated knowledge from cognitive and social psychology. The most tested
and widespread scientifically developed interview technique is the Cognitive
Interview (CI;  originally  developed by Geiselman,  Fisher,  MacKinnon,  &
Holland,  1985).  CI  is  a  good  starting  point  to  discuss  investigative
interviewing, especially in this thesis, because of its strong base in memory
psychology.
CI originally consisted of four mnemonic techniques aimed at facilitating
detailed  recollections:  context  reinstatement  (the  interviewee  is  guided  to
close eyes and think back to the events), an instruction to report everything,
an  instruction  to  recall  the  events  from a  variety  of  perspectives,  and  an
instruction to recall the events in different temporal orders. A few years later,
Fisher and Geiselman (1992) published an enhanced version of CI (ECI) in
which a more general approach to investigative interviewing was introduced,
aimed at optimizing the prerequisites for accurate and thorough recollections.
ECI included rapport building, not interrupting the witness, and posing open-
ended  questions.  Although  CI  and  ECI  were  originally  two  different
techniques, ECI comprises what we today usually refer to as CI. In line with
this,  unless  otherwise  stated,  ECI  (and other  modified  versions  of  CI)  is
included in what I hereby refer to as CI.   
About 30 years of testing have resulted in at least 70 studies that generally
support the hypothesis that CI elicits more detailed accounts than a standard
approach  to  interviewing  witnesses  (Memon,  Meissner,  &  Fraser,  2010).
Crucial  content  in  CI,  such  as  rapport  building,  eliciting  a  free  recall,
employing open questions,  and asking the witness to report  everything,  is
also recommended in other scientifically based interview techniques such as
the NICHD protocol  (specifically  developed for  interviewing children,  La
Rooy  et  al.,  2015).  CI  techniques  (Fisher,  Milne,  & Bull,  2011)  and  the
NICHD protocol  (La Rooy et  al.,  2015) are currently used in practice by
police  officers  in  several  countries,  for  example in  Norway,  the  UK,  and
Canada, when conducting interviews with witnesses.  
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When interviewing  about  events  that  have  occurred  repeatedly,  one  is
faced with the difficult task of distinguishing between gist details and details
belonging to a particular incident. In the scientific literature, the process of
unwinding  these  types  of  memories  is  commonly  referred  to  as
particularization (Powell et al.,  2007). Differently put, repeated events are
often recalled as a general cluster of events which, in applied settings (e.g.,
legal cases), needs to be particularized. Child abuse is among the types of
criminal  events  that  typically  occur  repeatedly.  The  NICHD  protocol
therefore includes explicit instructions to the interviewer to continuously ask
whether something described by the witness happened once or several times.
A few studies (Cohen & Java, 1995; Leins et al., 2014; Means et al., 1989;
Means & Loftus,  1991; Rivard, Fisher, Robertson, & Hirn Mueller,  2014)
have aimed at specifically testing the effects of CI or CI-inspired techniques
on the particularization of adults’ memories for repeated events. Cohen and
Java (1995) found that although CI did increase recollections to some extent
(an increase of 6%), it did so to a lesser extent than a recognition checklist
(29%; partly derived from the participants' own notes about their experienced
events).  Rivard et  al.  (2014)  taught  CI  to professional  interviewers  at  the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and compared it to the standard
interview that is routinely taught there. The results showed that CI was the
better technique for particularization, although the results were statistically
significant only after excluding one of the participants. This is in line with the
results from Leins et al. (2014) who found that CI was more effective for
particularization  than  a  control  interview.  Similarly,  Means  et  al.  (1989;
1991) found that a CI-based interview – in combination with a set of other
individual  mnemonics  (e.g.,  construction  of  a  timeline;  see  more  about
specific  mnemonics  in  the  section  below)  – increased  the  number  of
individual  events  recalled.  Thus,  it  seems that  CI  is  somewhat  better  for
particularization than a comparison interview, although the results are not as
clear cut as when it comes to interviews about single events.  
Specific Mnemonics
During an investigative interview, specific mnemonics can be added with the
hope of eliciting even more (accurate) information. As mentioned above, CI
originally  consisted of  four  mnemonics  (Geiselman,  et  al.,  1985):  context
reinstatement, report everything, recollection from a variety of perspectives,
and a change of temporal order. 
Additional mnemonics were introduced in ECI, for example instructions
to hold a particular image in mind and zoom in on it, and to follow a moving
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object  in  mind as  if  it  had  been  lit  up  by  a  moving spotlight  (Fisher  &
Geiselman, 1992). Since CI consists of packages of mnemonics that tend to
differ more or less across studies, we know little about the effectiveness of
the individual mnemonic techniques. 
Similarly, Leins et al. (2014) tested the effects of a package of mnemonics
on  the  recollection  of  repeated  family  events.  The  package  included  the
following mnemonics:  constructing  a  family  tree,  constructing  a  timeline,
normative cues (e.g., naming holidays that are common for families to get
together),  derived  cues  (cues  derived  from  other  individuals  who  have
experienced similar situations), self-generated cues (asking questions that can
activate  the  interviewee's  associative  network  and  help  her  generate  own
cues,  e.g.,  asking  why  family  events  occur),  and  sub-categorization  (e.g.,
asking  the  interviewee  to  think  about  events  involving  certain  family
members). 
Furthermore, the participants were asked about frequency, a technique also
suggested  by  Brubacher,  Powell,  and  Roberts  (2014)  for  the  purpose  of
interviewing child  witnesses,  and,  as  already mentioned,  this  technique  is
included in the  NICHD protocol.  The results  showed that  the  package of
mnemonics enhanced the recollection of individual events. Similarly, Means
et  al.  (1989:  1991)  found  that  their  CI-inspired  package  of  mnemonics
increased recollection of individual events. Aside from CI-mnemonics (Fisher
& Geiselman, 1992), their interview package also included the construction
of a timeline and specific probes such as thinking about the first visit, the last
visit, and whether or not any events or details were different in any way.
The  latter  mnemonic  is  also  one  of  the  techniques  recommended  by
Brubacher et  al.,  (2014) who summarized mnemonics they consider to be
ready for use in police interviews with child witnesses. They recommended
four specific mnemonics: episodic memory training (a practice in elaborate
memory reporting conducted just before the interview starts), asking for the
gist before asking for details, asking how many times something happened,
and asking about differences between events and details.
Relatively few mnemonics have been tested separately, which makes it
difficult to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of individual mnemonic
techniques. Some may be strong cues for recollection (or maybe only during
particular  settings),  while other may be less valuable or even superfluous.
Among the mnemonic techniques that have been tested separately are derived
cues  (Philips  &  Fisher,  1998),  the  construction  of  a  timeline  (Gosse  &
Roberts, 2013), and a type of memory training with adults aimed at lowering
the  number  of  inaccurate  reports  and  increasing  resistance  toward
unanswerable questions (Scoboria, Memon, Trang, & Frey, 2013). Episodic
memory training with child witnesses has also been empirically tested and is
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recommended by Brubacher et al (2014). A similar type of memory training
has been tested with adults for other purposes in clinical populations. Since
similar training may also be useful in investigative interviews, I will briefly
describe it in a separate section below.  
Memory Training
Individuals  with  affective  disorders  tend  to  recall  memories  that  lack
specificity (Williams et al., 2007); they suffer from an overgeneral memory
(OGM). Individuals with OGM tend to recover more slowly from depression
(than  individuals  who  recall  specific  memories),  and  after  recovery  from
depression they often continue to have OGM (see Raes et  al.,  2009,  who
summarizes  key  findings  from  several  studies).  In  addition,  it  has  been
reported across studies that individuals from non-clinical settings who have
OGM are  at  a  higher  risk  of  developing  emotional  stress  and depression
(Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2007). Several training programs have
therefore been developed during the past years, aiming at increasing memory
specificity in individuals with different types of psychological disorders. The
MEmory Specificity Training program (MEST; Raes et al., 2009) originally
consists of four training sessions of one hour each. The program runs over
four weeks and the sessions are held in groups led by an instructor. In the first
session  the  instructor  holds  a  lecture  about  memory  function  related  to
depression, and the meaning of OGM is explained to the participants using
examples. In the subsequent three sessions, memory specificity is thoroughly
practiced.  Between  sessions,  participants  have  homework  consisting  of
further  practice  in  retrieving  specific  memories.  The  overall  results,  from
across  three  conducted  studies  (Neshat-Doost  et  al.,  2013; Moradi,
Moshirpanahi,  Parhon,  Mirzaei,  Dalgleish,  &  Jobson,  20141;  Raes  et  al.,
2009), are that MEST successfully increases the number of specific memories
recalled.  The  positive  effects  of  the  training  remained  after  two (Neshat-
Doost et al., 2013) and three months (Moradi et al, 2014).
Similar training programs have been conducted with older adults (Serrano
et  al.,  2004;  Serrano  et  al.,  2012)  and  with  individuals  diagnosed  with
schizophrenia (Ricarte et al., 2012; Ricarte et al., 2014). Again, the overall
findings are that memory training has a positive effect  on the retrieval  of
specific memories.  One training program was administered online to non-
depressed college students (Maestas & Rude, 2012). The program consisted
of training in expressing oneself in one of three different ways of writing. The
1 The participants in Moradi et al.’s (2014) study were diagnosed with PTSD.
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results  showed that  writing  about  one's  feelings  and thoughts,  as  well  as
writing  vividly  with  a  lot  of  details,  increased  memory  specificity.  Most
surprising, though, was the largest increase found at a six-month followup
and not immediately after training. In addition, training in mindfulness has
proven  successful  in  increasing  memory  specificity  (Hargus,  Crane,
Barnhofer,  &  Williams,  2010;  Heeren,  Van  Broeck,  &  Philippot,  2009;
Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000).
Only  one  training  program  so  far  has  failed  to  increase  memory
specificity.  Mogoaşe,  Brăilean,  and  David  (2013)  had  dysphoric
undergraduate  students  going  through  concreteness  training  (originally
developed by Watkins,  Baeyens,  & Read,  2009,  and Watkins  & Moberly,
2009) which was administered online. The training consisted of reading two
written scenarios each day for about a week (e.g., “It is your birthday. Your
family organized a great surprise party for you at home.”). The participants
were instructed to concentrate on each scenario for two minutes and try to
picture  them in  thought  as  a  movie.  This  training  did  not  enhance  more
specific recall than in students who did not receive any training at all.
The above review of studies indicates that cognitive training might be a
useful tool for enhancing recollection in forensic interviews, for example in
cases where particularization of repeated events is an issue. However, such
training has never been tested for this particular purpose. It is important to
note, though, that none of the studies above has controlled the accuracy of
retrieved memories. This is an overall weakness in the OGM/AMT research
(Zlomuzica, Dere, Machulska, Adolph, Dere, & Margraf, 2014). Furthermore,
most of the studies had very few participants (sometimes less than 10). The
findings should therefore be interpreted with caution.
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Analyzing Details
Statement Analysis
After having elicited as detailed statements as possible during the interviews,
the statements need to be analyzed. In legal practice, the main purpose of the
analysis  is  to  judge  the  veracity  of  the  statements.  That  is,  making  a
professional judgment on the extent to which the interviewee reported the
events in a truthful manner. Veracity judgments are basically made daily in
legal investigations by, for example, police officers, prosecutors, judges, juror
members,  and  immigration  board  personnel.  Statement  analysis  in  legal
practice  is  rarely  conducted  in  the  systematic  way  that  is  preferred  by
researchers (see e.g.,  Kagan, 2003; Strömwall,  2010), and veracity criteria
commonly employed by legal practitioners lack scientific support (Willén &
Strömwall, 2012).
Scientifically  based techniques  for  assessing the veracity  of  statements
were initially developed in Europe (Germany and Sweden) during the 1960s
and 1970s.  These techniques were primarily developed for the purpose of
analyzing children's statements in very difficult cases concerning child sexual
abuse  (although the  Swedish technique,  Formal  Structure  Analysis,  had  a
wider scope of use and was employed in, for example, arson cases; Trankell,
1965). The Swedish technique never underwent any robust scientific testing
and was prematurely implemented into Swedish legal practice. In 1992, the
highly criticized technique was finally stopped from further use in Swedish
courts (Strömwall, 2010). Meanwhile, the German technique was developed
further and underwent a successively increasing number of scientific tests.
The method, still in use in German courts for particularly difficult cases of
child sexual abuse, is called  Statement Validity Assessment (SVA). The core
part of it is 19 fixed criteria referred to as  Criteria-Based Content Analysis
(CBCA). These 19 criteria concern different types of details (see Table 2) that
are supposed to occur more frequently in truthful statements than in deceptive
ones  (Köhnken,  2004),  which  is  generally  in  line  with  scientific  findings
(Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 2015; Amado, Arce,  Fariña, & Vilariño, 2016; Vrij,
2015).
Based upon more solid theory on memory function – although not  yet
used  in  practice  –  is  the  statement  analytic  technique  called  Reality
Monitoring (RM). The technique was originally developed during the 1980s
and  1990s  by  Johnson  and  Raye  (1981)  and  Alonso-Quecuty  (1992).
Similarly to CBCA, RM consists  of  a set  of  criteria supposedly useful  to
distinguish truthful  statements  from deceptive statements,  which scientific
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investigations generally support (Vrij, 2015). The RM criteria are still in need
of standardization, and different researchers tend to employ different criteria
(see  Table  2  for the  criteria  employed  in  Study  I).  Accuracy  rates  for
distinguishing  truths  from lies  with  CBCA or  RM generally  exceed 70%
(Vrij,  2015).  CBCA and RM were employed as  measures  of  amount  and
quality of detail in Study I.
Table 2. Criteria-Based Content Analysis and Reality Monitoring.
CBCA CRITERION RM CRITERION
1. Logical structure Visual details
2. Unstructured production Audio details
3. Quantity of details Smell
4. Contextual embeddings Taste
5. Interactions Physical sensations
6. Conversations Affective details
7. Unexpected complications Spatial details
8. Unusual details Temporal details
9. Superfluous details Cognitive operations
10. Details misunderstood Clarity
11. External associations Reconstruction
12. Subjective mental state Realism
13. Others' mental states
14. Spontaneous corrections
15. Lack of memory
16. Doubts about own testimony
17. Self-deprecations
18. Pardoning the other
19. Crime-specific details
Notes.  The  individual  criteria  included  in  RM  differ  somewhat  across
studies. The RM criteria listed above are those employed in Study I. 
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Autobiographical Memory Specificity
In  clinical  research,  amount  of  detail  in  the  reports  of  autobiographical
(episodic)  memories  is  commonly  investigated  with  the  Autobiographical
Memory Test (AMT), originally introduced by Williams and Broadbent  in
1986. The purpose of the test is to investigate the extent to which respondents
show symptoms of overgeneral memory (OGM). In the AMT, respondents
are asked to recall specific memories associated with a number of cue words.
A specific memory is defined as something which occurred within a one-day
time frame (e.g., “the day we spent in the woods on our last holiday”). 
Notably,  this  definition  corresponds  quite  well  with  remembering
individual episodes of recurring events, the scope of Studies II and III. The
reported memories are then typically categorized, by the researchers, as either
specific, specific-extended, or generic; a few additional categories exist, such
as  “error”  and “semantic”,  but  not  all  researchers  make  use  of  the  same
additional  categories (Griffith et  al.,  2012).  Individuals with symptoms of
depression (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004) and PTSD (Moore & Zoellner,
2007) tend more often to report generic memories – despite the instruction to
recall  specific  memories  – compared to individuals showing less  signs of
depression or PTSD (Williams et al, 2007).
The AMT categorization of reported memories has also been applied in
other ways without conducting the proper test. For instance, narratives from
interviews with children who had witnessed domestic violence were divided
into  short  utterances  and  then  categorized  as  either  specific,  specific-
extended, or generic (Orbach, Lamb, Sternberg, Williams, & Dawoud-Noursi,
2001). Similarly, Hargus, Crane, Barnhofer and Williams (2010) employed
this categorization procedure in narratives from individuals interviewed about
self harm and suicide attempts. Employing the AMT categorization procedure
on  narratives  has  shown  a  positive  correlation  with  the  outcome  from  a
properly  conducted  AMT  (Sumner,  Mineka,  &  McAdams,  2013).  AMT
categorization was used as a  measure  of  amount and quality  of detail  (in
narratives) in Studies II and III.   
Counting the Details
It should be noted that, currently, it is only researchers who conduct a proper
count of details included in a narrative. Legal practitioners instead tend to
make a more general assessment of whether or not a particular statement is
detailed enough (e.g., Willén & Strömwall, 2012), for instance, whether or
not the statement contains the amount of detail one can expect it to contain
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given the particular circumstances. Several researchers and practitioners have
suggested the implementation of more structured analyses and counts (see,
for  example,  Kagan,  2003),  and   lately  handbooks  (e.g.,  Gyulai,  Kagan,
Herlihy, Turner, Hárdi, & Udvarhelyi, 2013) have been published aiming at
educating  legal  practitioners  on  a  more  scientifically  based  procedure  for
assessments of credibility and reliability in asylum cases. However, despite
striving  toward  more  objective  measures,  there  are  still  no  measurements
used in practice for assessing amount of detail.  
Researchers, on the other hand, do have methodological procedures for
measuring amount of detail. Whether a statement analysis (such as CBCA or
RM)  or  an  AMT  categorization  of  reported  memories  is  conducted,
researchers will  go through at least three crucial steps when analyzing the
narratives.  How  each  of  these  steps  is  handled  by  the  researchers  can
potentially change the study conclusions substantially, although the content
of the narratives remains the same.
In the first  step,  the  researcher  must  conduct  the  categorization of  the
verbal content. This type of categorization is essential when striving toward
objectivity  and  away  from  general  and  overall  assessments.  Without  a
categorization into predefined groups of details, we will  not know what is
meant with a “detailed” account. For CBCA and RM, the categorization is
conducted according to the criteria of classifications, for example, to which
extent the narrative includes references to superfluous details, unusual details
or  unexpected  complications  (and  all  the  other  criteria). Similarly,  in  the
AMT procedure,  researchers  categorize  memory reports  as  either  generic,
specific-extended, or specific (and often into a few additional categories). 
These categories may be theoretically distinguishable from each other. In
practice,  however,  it  is  quite frequently the  case  that  different  researchers
interpret the one and same criterion/category differently (e.g., Sporer, 2012;
see also the AMT-categorization conducted in Study II). In addition, the same
verbal content can be understood and thus categorized differently by different
researchers.  Low intercoder agreement (also called interrater agreement or
interrater  reliability)  can  seriously  threat  the  validity  of  a  scientific
investigation.  It  is  thus  crucial  that  researchers  using  non-standardized
measures do measure the extent to which different raters came to the same
conclusions  on  the  same material.  The  interrater  agreement  must  also  be
correctly and transparently reported in the article. 
Unfortunately, the importance of this issue is too often neglected. It is, for
instance, still common that interrater agreement over the AMT categorization
is unsatisfactorily reported with simple percentage agreement, despite the fact
that percentage agreement does not take into account chance agreement (i.e.
agreement occurring by chance). Also highly relevant is that the presence of a
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criterion,  in  criteria-based  analyses  such  as  CBCA and  RM,  is  measured
differently. Most studies employ Likert scales (e.g., 1–5) while others employ
a binary measure (present vs. absent). As pointed out by Sporer  (2012), the
Likert scales can also have different ranges (e.g. three points or seven points)
and different endpoints (e.g., zero and two, or one and seven). The type of
measure employed is likely to affect the interrater reliability (i.e. fewer scale
points will likely result in higher agreement). Choosing which categories are
included in the calculation of interrater agreement is another researcher-made
decision that can actually affect the interrater agreement – and thus also the
study conclusion.
In the second step, it is time for the researcher to conduct the statistical
analyses.  The lack of  standardization in  the  AMT procedure has  not  only
resulted in the use of different categories in different studies, but also a lack
of  agreement  across  studies  on  which  categories  shall  be  included in  the
statistical analyses (Griffith et al., 2012). Neither is there agreement across
studies on the primary outcome measure. For example, while some studies
report  analyses  of  the  proportion  of  specific  memories,  others  report  the
proportion of generic memories, and still  others report the proportion of both
types of memories (Griffith et al., 2012). The outcome measure is the core of
any scientific study. No need to say that  different outcome measures may
result in substantially different conclusions. Crucial to the interpretation of
findings  is  whether  such  decisions  were  made  prior  to  or  after  the  data
collection  was  conducted,  or  at  least  before  any  analyses  (e.g.,  the
categorization) had been initiated. There is a substantial risk of questionable
research  practices  (such  as  p-hacking)  being  employed when there  is  too
much room for flexibility – and such practices can significantly change the
outcome and conclusions (Simmons et al., 2011). 
Thus, the third step regards how transparently the researcher decides to
report the procedures. It is currently common practice to not make it explicit
in the report when a particular decision was made, for example when it was
decided  which  outcome  measure  to  employ  as  the  primary  one.  Lack  of
explicit  and  transparent  reporting  can  lead  colleagues  astray  and severely
hamper knowledge accumulation (Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012). Arguably,
future research in AMT and statement analysis will benefit much from being
preregistered, enabling other researchers to make more accurate decisions on
which ways forward may be the most fruitful.
An  additional  methodological  issue  for  the  research  on  investigative
interviews  is  that  amount  of  detail  is  commonly  measured  separately  for
different parts of the narratives (e.g., free recall only, specific questions only,
and for the narratives in whole; see e.g., Leins et al., 2014, for an example of
this).  In  addition,  researchers  employ  different  interview  protocols  in
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different studies. These factors together make comparisons of results across
studies  complicated.  Thus,  measuring  the  amount  of  detail  reported  by
interviewees  is  far  from  a  straightforward  procedure.  It  surely  has  the
potential  of  getting  more  straightforward  by,  for  instance,  employing
preregistration,  transparent  reporting,  and  standardization  of  employed
measures.  This  could in  turn result  in the  development  of more objective
measures, with the potential for use also in legal practice. Currently, though,
it  is quite a mess, and this should be kept in mind when interpreting and
comparing study results from these fields. 
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Summary of the Included Studies
The present thesis consists of three empirical studies (Studies I, II, and III)
and one data paper (Study IV). As mentioned in the Introduction, the overall
aim  of  the  thesis  was  to  employ  research  designs  with  high  ecological
validity to investigate the amount and quality of detail  in interviews with
cooperative interviewees. The three empirical studies included in the thesis
were based on two data collections. Both data collections were experiments
designed to prioritize ecological validity on the cost of laboratory control,
resulting  in  designs  commonly  referred  to  as  quasi-experiments.  The
ecological  validity  in  both  experiments  were  prioritized  in  the  sense  that
participants  were  recruited  because  they  had  experienced certain  types  of
events  (criminal  offenses  or  dental  visits),  rather  than  being  a  randomly
selected sample recruited to experience a particular event controlled by the
researcher.  Experimental  research  on  investigative  interviewing  typically
employs  the  latter  design,  which  is  important  in  terms  of  establishing  or
outlining basic principles of psychological phenomena. Such research must
however be supplemented with ecologically valid research designs. Thus, an
essential contribution of the present thesis to previous studies in investigative
interviewing is the providing of three studies with high ecological validity.  
The  primary  outcome  measures  in  the  included  empirical  studies  are
measures of amount and quality of detail in the interviewees' verbal reports.
Such outcomes tend to be operationalized differently in different studies, and
a secondary aim of the present thesis was to bring this topic into the light by
discussing  potential  consequences  of  the  lack  of  standardization  of  these
measures. 
Each study included in the thesis is briefly introduced below, followed by
more detailed summaries of aims, methods and results.
Study  I  investigated  amount  and  quality  of  detail  in  true  and  false
confessions told by offenders. Amount and quality of detail were measured
by  employing  Criteria-Based  Content  Analysis  (CBCA)  and  Reality
Monitoring (RM).   
Study II investigated the effectiveness on particularization of adding one
interview after presenting interviewees with one of three types of memory
cues (mnemonics). Specifically, we investigated the effect of context-specific
cues derived from other respondents in an initial study. No previous studies
had investigated the effects of specific mnemonics on the  particularization of
adults’ memories  for  repeated  events.  In  addition,  there  is  no  previous
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(published) research on the effect  of  derived,  context-specific cues on the
particularization of repeated events.  Study II therefore aimed at increasing
our  knowledge  about  the  effectiveness  of  specific  mnemonics  –  more
specifically,  the  effectiveness  of  derived  cues  –  on  adults’ memories  for
repeated events.  Amount and quality of detail in the memory reports were
studied using different two measures of specificity: number of events referred
to and amount of detail provided about the events.  
In Study III,  we continued exploring the data initially collected for the
purpose  of  Study  II.  In  this  study,  we  elaborate  on  the  importance  of
distinguishing between two measures of specificity when studying memory
for repeated events: number of individual events referred to and amount of
detail recalled about the events. The influence of five factors on these two
measures of specificity were investigated.
Finally, Study IV is a data paper making the data from Studies II and III
freely  available  online.  Thus,  the  collected  and coded data  can  easily  be
reused by others for any purpose, such as teaching or conducting additional
research.  
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Disclosure Statement
Psychology  is  currently  facing  a  reproducibility  crisis  (Open  Science
Collaboration, 2015). One important reason for this may be that published
research  too  frequently  has  weaknesses  that  were  never  disclosed  in  the
publication  (John,  Loewenstein,  &  Prelec,  2012;  Simmons,  Nelson,  &
Simonsohn, 2011). This is a very serious problem, and the need for complete
and  transparent  reporting  of  methodological  procedures  and  analytical
decisions  was  recently  highlighted  by  the  world's  biggest  statistical
organization, the American Statistical Association (ASA), which have never
before during its 177 years of existence made an official statement of this
kind  (Wasserstein  &  Lazar,  2016).  One  way  of  practicing  transparent
reporting is to include a disclosure statement in the publication (Simmons,
Nelson,  &  Simonsohn,  2012),  where  what  is  reported  and  not  is  made
explicit.  It  would  be  a  substantial  waste  of  efforts  and  resources  to
continuously conduct research with no reproducible effects.  In the field of
legal and forensic psychology there is also an impending risk that individuals
can get seriously harmed if legal decisions are based on non-robust science.
Thus, the initiation of disclosure statements is hereby embraced.
Disclosure Statement for Study I
A rough sample size of about 30 participants was decided in advance. No
formal  power  calculation  was  conducted  and  the  participation  rate  was
expected to be low. Initially, 36 offenders participated in the experiment. The
narratives from six participants were excluded for different reasons. Three
respondents  were  excluded because  –  on  the  respondents'  initiative  –  the
narratives  were  not  focused  on  the  purpose  of  the  interview  (i.e.,  the
experiment). One was excluded because the false confession was so lengthy
that the interviewer had to end the interview prematurely. One respondent
was excluded because the narratives were severely incoherent to the extent
that  they  were  not  possible  to  understand.  One  respondent  was  excluded
because  the  interviewer  had  reason  to  believe  that  the  event  behind  the
supposedly true confession actually had taken place. All six respondents were
excluded prior to the statistical analyses being made. Some of the excluded
narratives were used by the research assistants/coders for training purposes.
In line with findings from Willén and Strömwall (2012), it was initially
predicted that gender and interview experience would influence the outcome
on CBCA and RM scores. These analyses were not statistically significant (p
> .05). In line with common publication practice (John et al., 2012), these
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predictions  were  therefore  deleted  from  the  report  and  the  two  variables
instead included as covariates.
Finally,  for  the  purpose of  any  future  research aiming to replicate  the
study, it should be noted that the interviewer also had criminal experience and
that all respondents were briefly informed about this (albeit not the nature of
the experience) during the recruitment process. Before granting access, the
prisons'  heads  of  security  did  a  thorough  check-up  to  ensure  that  the
interviewer was not familiar with any of the current prisoners (i.e., not only
potential respondents).
All manipulations and measures are reported in the paper.
Disclosure Statement for Study II
A rough sample size of about 30 respondents in each condition was decided
in advance. No formal power calculation was conducted.
There was no analysis plan prior to the data collection. It  was decided
after  the  data  collection  as  to  how  the  amount  of  detail  was  to  be
operationalized and statistically analyzed. The first statistical tests conducted
were two-tailed ANCOVAs with a  p > .10.  After reviewing the predictions
and the choice of statistical test, it was decided that contrast analyses would
be more suitable tests of the predictions.
Some measures were omitted from the report of Study II. All measures are
thoroughly reported in the data paper (Study IV).
The predictions concerning rehearsal and unpleasantness were made after
the data collection.
All data exclusions and manipulations are reported in the paper.   
Disclosure Statement for Studies III and IV
All made decisions as well as the process were completed just as they are
reported in the papers.
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Study I
Aims
Research  on  deception  detection  is  typically  conducted  in  a  mock-crime
scenario with undergraduate students. The main purpose of the present study
was to study these issues in a more ecologically valid setting. We investigated
the amount and quality of detail in true and false statements by criminally
experienced respondents. Amount and quality were measured with Criteria-
Based Content Analysis (CBCA) and Reality Monitoring (RM). In line with
previous research on CBCA (Undeutsch, 1982; Vrij, 2015) and RM (Johnson
& Raye, 1981; Vrij, 2015), we expected both techniques to generate higher
scores in truthful statements than in deceptive ones.    
Methods
Thirty offenders, serving time in prison at that time, provided one true and
one  false  confession  in  an  experiment  conducted  at  three  Swedish  low-
security  prisons  during  2009.  The  prisoners  received  written  and  verbal
information about the study from the experiment leader/interviewer at two
separate occasions: a couple of weeks prior to the study taking place and on
the  same  day  as  the  study  was  going  to  take  place.  Participation  was
anonymous  and  voluntary.  Each  respondent  received  compensation
equivalent to about six euros.    
Participants were interviewed one by one by the same interviewer. In one
interview,  the  respondent  gave  a  true  confession  about  a  crime  having
personally  committed  and  been  sentenced  for.  In  another  interview,  the
respondent gave a false confession about a crime having never personally
committed or been sentenced for.  Each interview lasted about 5‒10 minutes
and was preceded by a few minutes during which the interviewee prepared
for the upcoming interview. The participants did not know the topic of their
false  confession  until  they  were  given  it  from  a  research  assistant  who
selected it from a long, prepared list of crimes. The selection of topics was
carried  out  to  roughly  match  the  type  of  crime  concerned  in  the  true
confession. Participants were never given a violent lie scenario if their truth
did not involve any violence at all. In addition, it was regarded whether the
topic  of  the  truthful  account  concerned  one  specific  event  or  a  series  of
events.  For  example,  when  the  truth  concerned  an  isolated  incident,  the
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participant would not receive a lie scenario that concerned a series of events.
The order of interviews were counter-balanced; the number of respondents
giving the true confession in their first interview was the same as number of
respondents giving the false confession in their first interview.
Each interview started with the interviewer pointing out that she did not
know if the participant was going to give a true or false confession in that
particular  interview.  The  participant  was  then  reminded  to  give  each
statement in a convincing manner irrespective of the objective veracity status.
After a free recall, the interviewer used at least two and never more than five
open questions (e.g., “Do you remember anything more?”) in order to elicit a
complete statement. The number of open questions depended on how much
the interviewee revealed during the free recall.
The interviews were audio taped and transcribed verbatim.
Four research assistants, all blind for the objective veracity status of the
statements, were trained in either Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) or
Reality Monitoring (RM). Each narrative was scored for each criterion on a
five-point rating scale. The interrater reliability was excellent for both CBCA
and RM.    
Results
Overall, neither CBCA nor RM were successful techniques in distinguishing
the true confessions from the false,  giving no support  for any of our two
predictions. That is, there were no statistically detectable differences between
the  total  CBCA scores  or  the  total  RM  scores  between  the  truthful  and
deceitful statements. No individual RM criteria showed differences between
the  true  and  false  statements,  but  three  individual  CBCA criteria  could
statistically differentiate the statements. Surprisingly, there were more  self-
deprecations and doubts about own testimony in the false confessions than in
the true confessions. In addition, there were more unexpected complications
in the truthful confessions.  
Conclusions
Previous research conducted with respondents who lack criminal experience
has shown that CBCA and RM can be used to distinguish true accounts from
deceptive  ones.  The  observed  results  were  therefore  unexpected,  and
replications  are  important  to  reveal  whether  the  (almost  nil)  effects  with
criminally experienced individuals will replicate.
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Three individual CBCA criteria did however show differences – expected
as well as unexpected – between the true and false confessions. Thus, further
research  could  make  it  possible  to  differentiate  offenders'  true  and  false
confessions, and different types of statements other than confessions, through
a scientifically based technique for statement analysis.
31
General Method for Studies II, III, and IV
One data collection carried out in Gothenburg, Sweden, during the spring of
2012, forms the basis for Studies II, III, and IV. The project was approved (id:
1007-11) by the Regional Ethical Review Board, University of Gothenburg,
Sweden.
Participants
The  respondents  were  originally  recruited  through  advertisements  in  the
waiting rooms of 20 Gothenburg-area dental clinics which graciously allowed
us access. Due to difficulties in recruiting the large number of participants we
needed, we also emailed inquiries to individuals who had announced interest
in  participating  in  research  at  the  Department  of  Psychology.  We  further
asked personnel at a few of the 20 collaborating clinics to verbally inform
some of their patients about our study, namely patients younger than 30 years
because they were initially underrepresented in our sample, and respondents
who have made a very large number of dental visits (≥ 20 visits during the
past ten years). The criteria for participating (Swedish-speaking adults having
made about 8 visits or more) were the same, however, and differences in the
recruitment process are therefore not expected to have influenced the results
in significant ways. Participation was voluntary and compensated with a gift
card to each respondent (worth about 28 euros, valid at stores and restaurants
in Sweden).
Ninety-nine respondents participated in the study, although four had to be
excluded (because  they  did  not  bring  their  dental  records  and because of
interviewer  mistakes).  The  final  sample  consisted  of  95  respondents  (71
women) with a mean age of 43 years. They reported to have made on average
about 17 dental visits each (ranging from 6 to 60) during the past 10 years.
Deriving the Memory Cues for Study I
Prior to the major data collection, an initial study was conducted to derive the
cues to be used in Study I. Twenty-seven university students (27–54 years)
answered a short questionnaire and were compensated with one lottery ticket
each worth about three euros. They were asked to recall as many dental visits
as possible made during the past ten years. For every visit they recalled they
were additionally asked to answer what made them remember that particular
visit. Their answers to the latter question were categorized to form two types
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of  context-specific  derived  cues  (derived  specific  cues  and  derived
categories). Eight categories (Table 3, left column) were identified by the first
author  and  a  research  assistant.  These  categories  were  presented  to
participants in the derived categories condition when collecting data for the
major  study.  To create the specific  cues,  subcategories  within each of the
eight  categories  were selected,  five  quotations  within  each main category
(resulting  in  a  total  of  40  quotations).  A selected  quotation  was  either  a
representation  of  its  subcategory  or  considered  to  have  high  associative
potential  as  a  memory  cue.  These  40  quotations  together  with  the  eight
categories formed the memory cues in the derived specific cues condition.
Both types of derived cues are presented in Table 3.  
Comparison cues were selected with the aim of choosing cues that are
commonly  used  in  police  interviews  with  plaintiffs  and  witnesses.  The
following six cues were selected:
• The last visit
• The second-to-last visit
• The first visit
• The second visit
• Visits that stand out from the others
• Visits that co-occurred with a holiday or similar
All  cues  in  all  conditions  were  printed  on  cards  and  started  with  an
instruction to think back and see whether the cue (which was underscored)
would help them recall additional information about their dental visits. For
example: “Think back to times and dates” and “Think back to the last visit
you  made”.  In  the  derived  specific  cues  condition,  the  quotations
immediately followed their category. An example of a card in the derived
specific cues condition is found below (the cards without  quotations were
shorter). 
­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
Think back to conversations you had with the personnel.
“I promised the dentist to stop using snuff”
“I was instructed how to prevent caries”
“As usual, I asked if they could make my teeth more white”
“She said I had bad dental hygiene”
“I got calming information” 
    
Does this help you recall additional visits?
Does this help you recall additional details about the visits you have already reported?
­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
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Table 3. The derived cues employed in Study II.
CATEGORIES QUOTATIONS
Emotions and 
sense-experiences
“Worried that there would be an invasive procedure”
“It was unpleasant and painful”
“Afterwards, I had speech difficulties from the anesthesia”
“It smelled bad when the dentist drained the tooth”
“Afterwards, my mouth felt clean”
Conversations “I promised the dentist to stop using snuff”
“I was instructed how to prevent caries”
“As usual, I asked if they could make my teeth more white”
“She said I had bad dental hygiene”
“I got calming information”
Times and dates “The last two times, I had to make several fillings”
“I had to come back a couple of weeks after the routine visit”
“My birthday was to come”
“I usually get a dental recall card around summer time”
“It took several visits to fix”
Places and 
locations
“Met with a specialist in a new department”
“It was when I moved to Sweden”
“Had to go in emergency to a different clinic than the usual one”
“I still lived in my old flat”
“First and only time since I moved to Gothenburg”
Personnel “Heavy-handed dental hygienist”
“I noticed the name of the dentist”
“New dentist”
“My first visit to a dental hygienist”
“The dental hygienist was nice, explained well”
Economy “I had income support from the social services and they were supposed to pay, 
but it got too expensive so they didn’t want to”
“The quality of my teeth was downgraded”
“First visit since I had to pay for it”
“Cheaper than usual”
“I forgot my bank account number and couldn’t sign for a dental insurance”
Treatments “Impressioning”
“It didn’t bleed when the dentist removed the calculus”
“Had to sew in the mouth”
“She took some x-rays”
“The dentist’s drill”
Reasons for visit “Recommendation from my sister”
“Got problem with the same tooth again”
“Destroyed a tooth while biting and lost a filling”
”I had chipped one tooth”
”It was a different reason than usual”
Notes. Derived categories and specific cues. Both categories and quotations were 
presented in the derived specific cues condition. Only the categories were presented 
in the derived categories condition. All cues are translated from Swedish.
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The Interviews
All  participants  were interviewed twice.  Both interviews are included and
compared in Study I, while only the first interview forms the basis for Study
II.
Participants brought their dental records to the experiment in envelopes
that had been sealed by the personnel at the dental clinics. Everyone signed
an informed consent form before the experiment started. The experimental
session  lasted  between  90  and  120  minutes  for  each  respondent.  The
interviews  were  conducted  by  one  of  four  interviewers  who  followed  a
structured interview protocol. The length of the first interview was usually
around 30 minutes.
After the first interview, participants were presented with one of three sets
of  memory cues (derived specific  cues,  derived categories,  or  comparison
cues). The cues were printed on cards. For each condition there were 6 or 8
cards. The presentation order of the cards was randomized. All participants
received between 15 and 20 minutes with the cards, and all were offered an
additional 5 minutes if they wanted to. Participants were encouraged to make
notes on a paper to use as support during their second interview. They were
subsequently interviewed a second time in which they were asked whether
they recall anything that they did not report in their first interview. If their
answer was positive they would receive the same questions as in the first
interview. The second interview usually lasted about 10–15 minutes.
Post­interview Procedure
After  the  second  interview,  respondents  answered  a  post-interview
questionnaire  about  demographics  and  how  they  had  experienced  the
interview. They subsequently opened their sealed envelopes and had some
time to review their dental record if they wished. When they were ready they
received instructions from the experiment leader on how to anonymize the
dental record. The records were then copied, and the copy was later used in
the studies to establish objective truth.    
Data Preparation
Number of Events
One  research  assistant  coded  all  statements  and  the  corresponding  dental
records. He counted the frequencies for each measure that is included in both
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studies (Studies I and II). Another research assistant conducted independently
the same coding procedure for 21% of the material. Intraclass correlations
were  calculated  and  showed an  excellent  agreement  for  all  measures  (no
measure had an agreement less than .94).
Type of Memories
Type of memories measured the incidence of generic, specific, and specific-
extended memories (see below), and these variables were employed in both
Study I and Study II.  
All  transcripts  were  broken  down  into  short  utterances  similar  to  the
procedure employed in Orbach,  Lamb,  Sternberg,  Williams,  and Dawoud-
Noursi (2001). The work resulted in about 70,000 utterances. Each utterance
was then categorized into one of four categories that are commonly used in
the  Autobiographical  Memory  Test  (see  e.g.,  Griffith,  Sumner,  Raes,
Barnhofer, Debeer, & Hermans, 2012, and Hargus et al., 2010):  
• Generic –  Summaries  of  how something  usually  or  typically  occurs
(e.g., “because I’m often very dry in my mouth when being stressed”)
• Specific – A memory of something particular which lasted less than one
day (e.g., “they had a trainee there during that visit”)
• Specific-Extended –  A memory  of  something  particular  which  lasted
more than one day (e.g., “During that period I had a lot of acne”)
• Error – Not related to the dental visits or not containing any information
(e.g., “I don’t know,” “I can’t say which day it was”)
One assistant categorized all statements, and a second assistant categorized
21% of the statements. The interrater reliability was initially not impressive,
but  after  a  training  session  with  both  coders  the  agreement  reached  an
acceptable level (.66; Cohen’s unweighted kappa).
In addition, each utterance in the three categories (generic, specific, and
specific-extended) was verified by comparison with the dental records. This
work was conducted by two other assistants.  Each utterance was coded as
confirmed, refuted, or unverified. Again the interrater agreement was initially
considered too low and a training session did not  improve the agreement
enough. Instead, the two assistants worked together with each utterance they
disagreed upon until they reached an agreement of 100%. The main coder
was thereafter instructed to apply their common rules when coding the rest of
the material alone.  
36
Aims
Previous  studies  on  the  particularization  of  adults’ memories  of  repeated
events have either examined the effect of the Cognitive Interview (Cohen &
Java,  1995;  Rivard  et  al.,  2014)  or  the  effect  of  interview  techniques
involving a package of several mnemonics (Means et al., 1989; 1991; Leins
et al., 2014). Few studies have examined the effects of single mnemonics on
the particularization of adults’ memories. Inspired by the unpublished work
of Philips and Fisher (1998), the main aim of Study I was to investigate the
effect of one particular mnemonic, namely derived cues. 
Three packages of cues were compared: derived specific cues vs. derived
categories  vs.  comparison  cues.  We  predicted  that  derived  cues  would
generate more individual events (Hypothesis 1a) and more detailed memories
(Hypothesis 2a) than the cues that are commonly used in police practice. In
addition,  we  expected  that  derived  specific  cues  would  generate  more
individual events (Hypothesis 1b) and more detailed memories (Hypothesis
2b) than the derived categories. We further expected rehearsal to be positively
associated  with  participants’ recollection  (Hypothesis  3),  and  that  higher
levels of unpleasantness would be associated with better recall of the dental
visits (Hypothesis 4).
Methods
This  study  was  a  quasi-experiment  making  use  of  the  experimental
manipulation – including one interview prior to the manipulation (Interview
I) and one interview following the manipulation (Interview II) – described in
the section General Method for Studies II, III, and IV.
Results
In line with Hypotheses 1a and 1b, derived cues tended to be somewhat more
effective for the recollection of individual events and details about the events
than the comparison cues. In contrast, there were no statistically detectable
Study II
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differences  between  the  two  types  of  derived  cues  for  any  of  the  two
measures.
Rehearsal of the memories by telling them to others was associated with
an  increased  number  of  recollected  events  and  details  which  supported
Hypothesis 3. It mattered most how much the respondents had talked about
the events and, to a lesser extent,  how much the respondents had thought
about their dental visits. Partly in line with Hypothesis 4, higher levels of
unpleasantness predicted a small increase in the number of referred visits but
not in the number of details about the recalled visits.  Importantly, derived
cues did not decrease accuracy compared to cues that are commonly used in
police practice. 
Conclusions
The findings suggest that derived cues might be a valuable contribution to
packages  of  mnemonics  that  aim  at  facilitating  the  particularization  of
repeated events for adults. However, how specific the cues (derived specific
cues vs. derived categories) need to be in order to be as effective as possible
should be further investigated.  Future research on the usefulness of single
mnemonics may consider increasing statistical  power by employing larger
samples.  The effects  observed in  studies  of  interview techniques  that  use
several mnemonics cannot be used for drawing conclusions about the size of
effects in studies of single mnemonics since the merged effects of several
mnemonics likely are stronger than the effects of single mnemonics.  
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Study III
Aims
Study III extends Study II by further investigating two different measures of
memory specificity: the number of individual events and the amount of detail
provided  about  the  events.  The  overall  aim  was  to  inspire  new research
questions  and  provide  new  understanding  about  employed  memory
specificity measures in research on repeated events. We did so by studying
the  influence  of  five  factors  (interviewees’ age,  number  of  experienced
events, interviewer, perceived unpleasantness concerning the events, and how
much the interviewee had rehearsed the memories)  on the two specificity
measures. The study was exploratory and therefore the direction of effects
were kept open.   
Methods
This study was based on the data collected for Study II. The present study did
however only investigate data from Interview I, that is, the participants' (n=
95)  memory  reports  prior  to  given  the  memory  cues.  The  transcribed
narratives  from  Interview  I  consisted  of  over  40,000  utterances.  These
narratives and the corresponding dental records were studied for the purpose
of the present study. For more details about the methods, please see Study II.
Results
As can be seen in Table 4, it was found that the two specificity measures were
affected differently by all five factors. Recollections of individual events were
positively  affected  by  an  increase  in  number  of  experienced events,  high
levels of unpleasantness, and if respondents had talked much about the events
(prior  to  being  interviewed).  Contrasting  these  effects,  amount  of  detail
provided about the events was not affected by any of these three factors. Only
the interviewer seemed to positively affect  amount of detail provided about
the events,  and there was a decrease of details  (but  not  events)  with age.
Thinking about the events prior to the interview showed no effect on either
measure.  Additionally,  a  particular  side  finding  is  worth  mentioning:
participants typically underestimated how many dental visits they had made.
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Conclusions
Interviews about repeated events may become more effective if researchers
and practitioners start to distinguish between two types of specificity: number
of individual events recalled and amount of detail provided about the events.
The results suggest that factors such as number of experienced events and
the presence of trauma can affect  these two memory specificity  measures
differently.  Interview  techniques  may  therefore  be  more  effective  if
specialized toward generating either  individual  events or details  about  the
events.  Furthermore,  failed  interviewee  motivation  might  occur  sooner  or
later.  In  some  cases,  it  might  therefore  be  necessary  for  practitioners  to
prioritize whether to extract additional events or additional details about the
events.    
Table 4. Influence of five factors on two measures of specificity.
Factor Referred events Referred details
Age No Yes
Experienced events Yes No
Interviewer No Yes
Unpleasantness Yes No
Rehearsal Partlya No
Notes. a It did matter how much the respondent had talked about the events 
but not how much they had thought about them.
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Study IV
Aims
Because of word limits frequently employed in scientific journals, the method
sections in articles often have to be more concise than would be optimal for
anyone  wanting  to  replicate  the  research.  Publishing  a  data  paper
accompanying  the  empirical  research  articles  is  currently  an  option  to
increase reproducibility.
The present study is  a data paper,  which is published in a (gold) open
access journal, consisting of all extracted data and all employed material that
formed the basis for Studies II and III. Thus, the purpose of the paper was to
make  all  data  and  material  from  Studies  II  and  III  publicly  and  freely
available for others to reuse.
Content
The methods for data collection and data extraction for Studies II and III are
exhaustively described and accompanied with links to the online repositories
where the data (with codebook) and material are stored in open formats. All
the data and material  are freely available to anyone for any purpose with
appropriate citation.   
Reuse Potential
The  data  can  be  reused  as  data  from  an  experiment  (including  both
interviews, as in Study II) or as single interview data (including data only
from Interview I, as in Study III). The data can be used for research as well as
for educational purposes. In addition, the material can be modified and reused
for new research.
Not all variables were analyzed in Studies II and III, and the data paper
highlights three such variables that could be analyzed in future research: The
proportion  of  dental  visits  that  were  never  mentioned by  the  respondents
could  sometimes  exceed  90%.  This  variable  is  potentially  interesting  to
investigate further from a memory and/or interview perspective. How many
times the respondents had moved during the past ten years and how often
they had visited the dentist were questions included in the questionnaire but
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never analyzed. These variables could be used to further study, for example,
the distinctiveness principle (Surprenant & Neath, 2009).
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General Discussion
The three empirical studies comprising the present thesis span across several
different  research  themes  – from  the  detection  of  false  confessions  with
statement analysis to factors influencing recollection of repeated events and
mnemonics that may facilitate recollection of repeated events. Nevertheless, I
began  this  thesis  by  highlighting  three  main  commonalities  between  the
studies.  First,  variations in amount and quality of detail  were the primary
outcome measures. Second, the interviews were conducted with cooperative
interviewees.  Third,  the  experienced  events  took  place  under  natural
circumstances  and  thus  were  not  planned,  induced,  or  controlled  by  any
researcher. These commonalities will compose the structure for the discussion
of main findings and implications for future research.
Eliciting Details from Cooperative Interviewees
The  results  from  Studies  II  and  III  point  out  several  difficulties  of
remembering  repeated  events,  but  they  also  demonstrate  possibilities  in
findings ways to facilitate recollection. Study II showed that  derived cues
could be a meaningful  mnemonic for enhancing recollection of individual
events, while Study III highlighted outcome differences depending on how
amount of detail is operationalized and measured when studying memory for
repeated events. The difficulties and possibilities are, respectively, discussed
below.
Study III showed that all five investigated factors had different influence
on the two measures of specificity (namely, number of events recalled and
amount of detail provided about the events). This finding has implications for
methodological practice as well as for how techniques can be developed for
improving  recollections.  Future  study  designs  should  consider  both
specificity measures, even if choosing not to study both in the same study,
and  particularization  of  repeated  events  could  possibly  become  more
effective if a clear distinction is made between the two measures.  Differently
put,  mnemonics  may  become  more  effective  if  customized  to  enhance
recollection of either events or details, instead of developing mnemonics with
the general aim to enhance particularization.
A valid question is why the two measures are affected differently. One
reason may be that it is more difficult to specify individual events than it is to
describe details  about  them.  Study II  showed that  the  number  of  recalled
events  increased  from six to  eight  in  the  second interview (i.e.,  after  the
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participants had taken part of the cues). Hence, the increase was only about
two  events  on  average.  In  contrast,  the  amount  of  detail  (specific  and
specific-extended memories)  was increased from about 300 to almost  400
utterances. Thus, there are likely more opportunities to trigger memories of
details  than  to  trigger  memories  of  individual  events.  In  line  with  this
explanation,  the  findings  in  Study  III  regarding  influence  of  age  on
recollection  of  individual  events  (no  effect)  and  recollection  of  specific
memories (a decrease with age, in line with previous research, Phillips &
Williams,  1997;  Rabinowitz  et  al.,  1982) may be due to  the fact  that  the
number of referred events was relatively small for most participants.
A number  of  studies  with  children  have  shown  that  recollections  of
repeated events tend to be more generic and less specific than recollections of
single events (e.g.,  Roberts & Powell,  2001;  Schneider,  Price,  Roberts,  &
Hedrick, 2011). Somewhat in line with this, Means and Loftus (1991) found
that  adults’ reports  about  repeated events  were less  complete  than reports
about  single  events.  An implication of these results  may be that  accounts
about repeated events will include a larger portion of generic memories as the
number of experienced events increases. In Study III we did not find such a
relationship.  The  proportion  of  generic  memories  did  not  increase
significantly as the number of events increased. This indicates that the actual
number of events is not very important to the proportion of generic memories
as  long  as  it  regards  a  series  of  many  events  (our  respondents  had
experienced  between  6  and  80  events).  Hence,  in  adding  our  findings  to
previous research we can conclude that an individual who has experienced a
number of similar events – regardless of how many – is likely to provide less
specific memories than someone who has experienced one single event.     
Study III  also  showed how difficult  it  is  for  people  to  make  accurate
estimations of how many times they have experienced a particular type of
event. The number of experienced events was frequently underestimated, a
finding that is supported by previous research. Underestimations of repeated
and similar events have been reported for adults by, for example, Thompson
and Mingay (1991)  and for  children in  a  study by Sharman,  Powell,  and
Roberts (2011). Estimations of event frequency are common in legal settings
(Powell et al., 2007) as well as in surveys (Means et al., 1989; Thompson &
Mingay,  1991),  and  it  is  important  for  researchers  and  practitioners  to
consider  these  findings  when  deciding  how  to  interpret  and  weight  the
estimations.  
   Despite the many difficulties, Study II adds to the literature (Brubacher et
al.,  2014;  Leins  et  al.,  2014;  Means  et  al.,  1989;  1991)  showing  that
successful  particularization  is  possible.  Specifically,  it  demonstrated  that
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derived cues aided particularization to a greater extent than the comparison
cues.
Four  specific  mnemonics  have  been  recommended for  use  in  forensic
interviews with children who report about recurring incidents (Brubacher et
al.,  2014): episodic memory training, asking for the gist  before asking for
details,  asking  continuously  how  many  times  something  happened,  and
asking whether there were details or events that stood out from the rest. The
last mnemonic, asking for differences, has not yet been tested empirically,
according to Brubacher et al. (2014), while the others have. Study II is one of
the first studies to empirically test the effect of specific mnemonics on the
particularization of adults’ memories. More research on adults is needed in
order  to  enable  similar  recommendations  to  legal  practitioners  and fellow
researchers.
Particularization of adults’ memories is sometimes needed in legal settings
(e.g., Leins et al., 2014; UNHCR, 2013) as well as in research designs where
memories of repeated events are studied (e.g., Means et al., 1989). Different
types of mnemonics may be suitable for different purposes. Asking certain
questions,  as  those  suggested  by  Brubacher  et  al.  (2014;  e.g.,  asking  for
differences), as well as employing a timeline (Gosse & Roberts, 2013; Leins
et al., 2014; Means et al., 1989) may be suitable for both purposes. Several
questions and a timeline may also be employed in studies conducted online. 
The case of derived cues is a bit more complex since it is event specific,
but there is nothing suggesting that it would not work in both settings. Other
techniques,  such  as  the  Cognitive  Interview  (Fisher  &  Geiselman,  1992;
Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985), may be foremost suitable
for forensic settings because interaction is needed, otherwise the technique
would be so time demanding that online respondents would be fatigued. The
development and refinement of interview techniques for legal settings may
also gain much from turning to clinical research conducted on overgeneral
memory (Williams & Broadbent,  1986)  and training in  retrieving specific
memories (e.g., Raes et al., 2009). It is possible that a similar training could
be worthwhile in legal cases concerning repeated events, or that specific and
more  succinct  techniques  could  be  elicited  from  the  clinical  training
programs. It is important to note, though, that the clinical programs do not
consider accuracy of retrieved memories but only how to increase the amount
of  specific  memories.  In  legal  settings,  however  (as  well  as  in  research
methodology), accuracy is of key importance.
The distinctiveness principle (Surprenant & Neath, 2009) states that items
are  better  remembered if  they differ  somehow from the other items.  This
distinctiveness must not be present during encoding but could be created at
the time of retrieval. Events that have occurred repeatedly are, by definition,
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less distinct simply because there are many items that are very similar to each
other.  We therefore  need  to  help  interviewees make their  memories  more
distinct.  We  can  do  this  by  developing  and  testing  mnemonics  that  are
effective for this particular purpose. Study III suggests that such mnemonics
should be aimed at either enhancing particularization of individual events or
extracting details about the events. Recollections of repeated events can be
inaccurate for several reasons (Bartlett, 1932; Johnson et al., 1993; Neisser,
1981; Schank & Abelson, 1977) and we therefore need a specialized toolbox
of  techniques  for  memories  of  recurring  events.  Studies  II  and  III  in  the
present thesis aimed at contributing to the development of such a toolbox.
Analyzing Details from Cooperative Interviewees
None of the criteria-based techniques employed for measuring amount and
quality  of  detail  in  Study  I  could  successfully  distinguish  the  truthful
confessions from the false. Quite surprisingly, the technique with the most
solid theoretical base (Reality Monitoring; Johnson & Raye, 1981) turned out
to be the one least  successful  in distinguishing the statements.  Is  this  the
result  of  a  true non-effect?  Is  it  a  consequence of  the  employed research
design, such as the fact that the participants told both of their confessions
with  only  minutes  between  them?  Or  are  the  supposedly  truthful  and
deceptive confessions so very alike simply because the respondents did not
comply  with  the  instruction  to  tell  one  false  and  one  true  confession?
Differently put, maybe there are no differences because the within-subjects
design failed. Unfortunately, none of these explanations, not even the latter
one, can be ruled out. Only more research can give us enough evidence to
estimate the probability of different explanations.
However,  let  us  for  a  while  pretend  we  knew  for  a  fact  that  the
respondents  actually did follow the instructions;  they did tell  one truthful
confession of a crime they had committed and been sentenced for, and one
false  confession  of  a  crime  they  had  never  committed  and  never  been
sentenced for. Given this starting point we can draw the following additional
conclusions: (1) the offenders either told very convincing lies  or they told
very  unconvincing  truths;  (2)  differences  between  truthful  and  deceptive
confessions were statistically detectable only for three different measures of
amount and quality of detail out of 28 separate measures (30 if also counting
the total scores for RM and CBCA).
In  the  original,  published  report  for  Study  I,  the  possibility  of  the
offenders  telling  very convincing lies  was in  focus,  while  the  contrasting
possibility  never  really  occurred  to  us.  What  if  the  offenders  rather  told
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unconvincing truths? To bring more clarity into this, we can turn to a study
(Strömwall & Willén, 2011) conducted with the same offenders on the same
occasion as the data collection for Study I. Strömwall and Willén asked the
offenders  what  they  did  to  convince  the  interviewer  that  their  deceptive
confession actually was true. The single most commonly reported answer to
this question was to keep the made-up story close to truly experienced events.
A few even said outright that they aimed to keep  both statements as similar
to each other as possible, which gives some support to the above suggested
explanation  that  the  lack  of  differences  were  an  artifact  of  the  employed
research design. However, an implication of this is also that the offenders
might  have  deliberately  chosen  to  make  the  truthful  statement  seem less
convincing  in  order  to  hide  supposedly  deceptive  features  of  their  false
statement. 
Previous research has shown that criminally experienced individuals do
tend to hold more accurate beliefs about signs of deception than the general
public  does  (Granhag,  Andersson,  Strömwall,  & Hartwig,  2004),  but  they
also  tend  to  agree  that  deception  really  is  a  cognitively  demanding  task
(Strömwall & Willén, 2011). In addition, the offenders were very well aware
of  the  fact  that  suspects  are  not  the  ones  responsible  for  proving  their
innocence – it is up to the police officer to prove their guilt (Strömwall &
Willén, 2011). Altogether, it may be a fruitful strategy – in real life as well as
during Study I – to keep truthful statements less convincing (e.g., by keeping
it  succinct  and  less  forthcoming)  instead  of  wasting  energy  on  the  more
demanding task of telling a convincing lie. This explanation is supported by
an  earlier  study  surveying  criminally  experienced  and  criminally  naive
respondents about which lie strategies they would use during a hypothetical
police interview (Granhag, Clemens & Strömwall, 2009). It was found that
the  criminally  experienced  respondents  provided  significantly  less
information than the naive respondents, despite the fact that they (arguably)
seemed  less  credible  when  obviously  not  cooperating.  If  these  type  of
strategies are commonly employed by (criminally experienced) suspects and
witnesses  in  real-life  investigations,  we  might  need  to  revise  current
psychological  theories  on  strategies  employed  by  innocent  versus  guilty
suspects (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). Unfortunately, it is not very likely that
we will  learn more about  these issues  in  the  near  future  since it  is  quite
difficult to recruit real offenders to test a theoretical framework on suspects'
strategies during police interviews.  
Differences between truthful and deceptive confessions were statistically
detectable  only  for  three  –  out  of  28  –  measures  (i.e.,  individual  criteria
included  in  CBCA  and  RM)  of  amount  and  quality  of  detail.  These
differences  may  have  been  a  result  of  chance  alone.  Notably,  inferences
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drawn from this type of study tend to be that “there were no differences in
amount or quality of detail between statements,” or the opposite, that “there
were significant differences in amount or quality of detail.” But what if we
had instead employed the AMT categorization as the outcome measure? What
if we had instead used any other measure of details? Because details can be
measured in a variety of ways, comparisons of findings across studies are
difficult.  This  is  one  methodological  weakness  in  previous  and  current
research on investigative interviewing that needs to be addressed (more on
this in the next section).
In legal practice, statement analysis is commonly used when assessing the
veracity  of  plaintiffs'  (Köhnken,  2004)  and  asylum  seekers'  statements
(Kagan, 2003), but less often to assess statements by suspects. There may be
judicial reasons for not doing so (suspects are not bound to speak the truth;
Gregow, 1996), but there are certainly no psychological reasons to not also
conduct a proper statement analysis of a suspect's claims. On the contrary,
independent assessment of the statements from both parties would in the best
case increase the amount of evidence pointing in a certain direction. In the
worst  case,  it  would result  in  contradictory results.  In  any case,  it  would
certainly decrease the error rate.   
Research Designs for the Future
Research  on  investigative  interviewing  typically  employs  a  mock-crime
paradigm, a role play where the typical participants are students or children
pretending to be witnesses or suspects in a legal investigation. Obviously, this
type of research does not score high on ecological validity. Study I and Study
II  contributed  to  the  previous  literature  on  investigative  interviewing  by
employing designs with higher ecological validity, and more such research is
definitely needed.
An  additional  concern  with  the  mock-crime paradigm is  that  it  is  not
standardized. Sometimes the ”crime” concerns wiping out something from a
blackboard  (e.g.,  Vrij,  Akehurst,  Soukara,  &  Bull,  2002),  sometimes  it
concerns a missing book from a store or library (e.g., Granhag, Strömwall,
Willén,  & Hartwig,  2013).  There is  little  known,  for example,  about  how
strong the manipulation needs to be to generate measurable effects. This in
turn – as is also the case with the lacking standardization alone – has the
negative side effect of complicating calculations of the required sample size
for  future  studies;  we rarely know what  to  expect  from our  chosen study
design.  Lack  of  standardization  also  complicates  comparisons  of  findings
across studies. 
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As  previously  discussed,  similar  difficulties  are  faced  in  research  that
measures amount and quality of detail in autobiographical memory reports.
Although AMT categorization, as conducted for Studies II and III, has the
potential  of  being  standardized  (Griffith  et  al.,  2012),  no  standardized
instruments to measure amount and quality of detail in memory reports seem
to  exist  at  the  moment.  Future  research  should  be  conducted  focusing
specifically on developing a standardized measure of amount and quality of
detail.  Such research should consider  scientific  needs as  well  as  practical
significance. For example, by developing a measure that can detect minor
differences while also being a measure that is relevant to legal practice where
differences in detail currently are assessed without instruments. Crucially, all
results  from  such  research  should  be  made  freely  available  in  an  online
repository. 
Ideally, a standardized measure like this should also include guidelines on
information  to  consider  (and  provide)  when  preregistering  research  that
measures amount and quality of detail in memory reports. A current practice
that seems common is to divide the memory reports into different units (e.g.,
free recall and answers to specific questions) and analyze them separately.
Future guidelines should also recommend that  a thorough analysis plan is
provided (prior to the data collection beginning) with the preregistration to
avoid these types of undisclosed questionable research practices. These are
critical and urgent matters to deal with if we are serious about conducting
effective  and  high-quality  research  that  really  contributes  to  knowledge
accumulation and better legal practices.  This is also important to deal with to
ensure  that  forensic  and  experimental  psychologists  provide  well-founded
recommendations to legal practitioners and decision makers. 
Limitations
One of the main strengths of Study I is also one of its main weaknesses. We
did achieve quite a high ecological validity, but in this particular case it was
on the  cost  of  establishing  objective  truth.  The  results  must  therefore  be
interpreted with caution until more controlled research, preferably with larger
samples, can replicate them.  
Two important  limitations of Studies II  and III  concern the design and
sample  size.  While  Study  II  was  mainly  confirmatory  in  its  nature,  the
research questions in Study III were formed after the data collection and the
study  is  thereby  exploratory.  Consequently,  the  grounds  for  drawing
conclusions  about  the  findings  could  be  viewed  as  somewhat  stronger  in
Study II than Study III. However, Study II suffered from low-observed power
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(about  35%;  the  same low power  that  is  observed in  most  psychological
research, Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012) and the observed effects may
therefore  be  inflated  (Button  et  al.,  2013).  In  addition,  both  studies  were
partly based on data with large variations. This was especially the case for
types of memories and number of experienced events. It is thus important to
consider  these  limitations  when interpreting the findings  and await  future
(high-powered and preferably preregistered) studies to see whether or not the
results  are replicated. Future research should specifically aim at recruiting
respondents who have experienced a very large number of events, at least 30
visits, to enable in-depth analyses on the effects of number of experienced
events.
Furthermore,  as  implicitly  stated  in  an  earlier  section,  Disclosure
statement, it should be noted that neither Study I nor Study II were reported
in a completely transparent fashion in the original publications. Clearly, there
was  additional  information  about  the  procedures  that  could  have  been
reported in the articles. This fact can be viewed from different perspectives.
One possible conclusion is that the conducted research must have been pretty
flawed to motivate  the  omission or  withholding of  methodological  and/or
statistical information from the original report. A different conclusion could
be that the conducted studies were not flawed and that the decisions to omit
information was correct,  for instance, because of word limits practiced by
journals. Readers agreeing with this second perspective might in turn argue
that  it  was the wrong decision to  disclose the  omitted information in  the
present  thesis  because  it  might  wrongfully  give  the  impression  that  the
conducted research was more flawed than most research.
A  third  potential  perspective  is  that  times  are  currently  changing.
Psychological science is in a transforming state: between old (outdated and
closed) practices and new (honest and open) ways. As Brian Nosek and Chris
Chambers (2015) put it: “[F]uture generations [will] look on the term ‘open
science’  as a tautology – a throwback from an era before science woke up.
‘Open  science’ will  simply  become  known  as  science,  and  the  closed,
secretive practices that define our current culture will seem as primitive to
them as alchemy is to us.” Employing this perspective, one will soon realize
that active researchers who were taught in the old-school ways could easily
get stuck in the middle, being blamed for realizing too late that they were
wrongly taught. Discouraged by the risk of facing blame, one might prefer to
not disclose old sins nor embrace the new era, and instead hang on to the
familiar  practices.  I  cannot  emphasize  enough  the  importance  of  this  not
becoming  reality,  not  only  because  it  would  hinder  or  at  least  delay  the
transformation process  toward  a  better  science,  but  also  because it  is  not
right. It is easy to be the one knowing more, knowing first, knowing better.
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Less easy to admit wrongdoing. Less easy to disclose hidden weaknesses of a
lifetime work. Open science is connected to the open source movement in
which kindness is an integrated part. Let us not forget the kindness when our
science opens up.         
Conclusions
Suspects' accounts are rarely assessed in the same methodological manner as
is done with statements by plaintiffs (Köhnken, 2004). This is unfortunate
because independent assessments of both parties' statements may double the
amount  of  evidence pointing in  a  certain direction,  or,  at  worst,  result  in
contradictory results. In any case, such a procedure would decrease the error
rate. Study I tested the effectiveness of such assessments on true and false
confessions made by cooperative interviewees. Contrary to the expected, the
results showed very few differences between the truths and lies. However,
some  differences  were  identified  to  show  that  truthful  and  deceptive
statements by cooperative suspects may be successfully distinguished in the
future.
Research on the particularization of adults’ memories for repeated events
is still  in its infancy. There are, however, many possibilities.  For instance,
established findings from studies with children (e.g., Brubacher at al., 2014)
could be integrated, and the usefulness of memory specificity training (Raes
et al., 2009) that is developed for clinical populations could be tested in new
settings. Furthermore, the results from Study III suggested that we may be
able  to  develop  more  effective  mnemonics  if  we  distinguish  between
recollection of individual events and recollection of details about the events.
Study  II  indicated  that  derived  cues  may  be  one  valuable  mnemonic  for
increasing the recollection of individual events. However, there is a need to
investigate  why  the  two  specificity  measures  are  affected  differently.  An
answer to this question could inspire the development of even more effective
techniques.
The  current  thesis  contributes  to  previous  research  on  investigative
interviewing in at least three ways. First, the studies' had a high ecological
validity,  which is  rather  unusual  in  the  field of  investigative interviewing
where amount and quality of detail is studied. Second, the raw data from two
of these studies have been made freely available online, making it possible
for  other  researchers  to  delve  deeper  into  the  data.  Third,  the  lack  of
standardization  in  experimental  psychologists'  measures  of  amount  and
quality of detail (in memory reports) is raised as an urgent issue. 
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In addition, the current thesis contributes to the ongoing methodological
revolution in psychological science (De Groot, 1956/2014) in at least three
ways.  First,  by  practicing  transparent  and  honest  reporting  throughout,
including a disclosure statement for each study. Second, by publishing the
raw data for Studies II and III. Third, by pointing out that counting details in
memory reports today is characterized by non-standardized procedures with a
jungle  of  possible  measures  and  analyses  to  choose  from.  The  lack  of
standardization and the  tradition of  dividing narratives  into separate  units
(e.g.,  free  recall  and  answers  to  specific  questions)  results  in  many
opportunities for biased decisions and questionable practices. This needs to
be considered whenever asked whether or not we can count on the details.   
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